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Transforming the Central American Customs Union into  a
modem common market can be achieved only by reforming the
tariff regime.  Here is an  action plan for rationalizing and
harmonizing Central American tax structures.
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To harmonize tax policies among Central  *  Harmonizing taxes on inputs and exempting
American nations, Baran recommends the  nontraditional exporters from paying import
following:  duties.
e Continuing trade liberalization, by reducing  *  Moving toward coordinating taxes on factor
the level and dispersion of effective trade  incomes (personal and corporate income,
protection.  property and land taxes, and taxes on financial
gains)  to avoid  double  taxation.
* Shifting the tax system from reliance on
trade to reliance on domestic transactions and  *  Eliminat.ng all quantitative import restric-
income.  tions, prior imports deposits, non-common
import tariffs, and other restrictions on imports
* Making the value-added tax (cum selective  from other CACM members.
consumption taxes) the backbone of the tax
system, and harmonizing those taxes among the  *  Applying similar principles in designing
member countries of the Central American  export taxes on coffee and bananas.
Common  Market  (CACM).
* Not using differential exchange rates to dis-
* Improving tax administration  criminate against regional trade.
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1987  .45I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  This  report  proposes  an action  plan  for  the  rationalization  of tax
structures  for  Central  America. The  report  also  outlines  broad  principles
to  harmonize  taxes  among  the  Central  American  Comon Market  (CACH)  member
countries. For  the  purpose  of this  study,  the  CACM  excludes  Nicaragua  (a
member),  but  includes  Honduras  (a  non-member). A separate  study  under
progress  in  the  Bank  will undoubtedly  analyze  benefits  and  costs  of
integration  and  review  conditions  under  which  integration  would  be
economic. This  report  assumes  that  harmonization  is indeed  economic.
However,  the  report's  main  conclusions  on the  rationalization  of tax
systems  in  Central  America  would  still  be valid  even  if integration  is
found  to  be unsound. Furthermore,  the  report  excludes  Nicaragua  from  the
analysis  due  to lack  of information.  This  report  does  not  deal  with the
issue  of  expenditure  rationalization.  Clearly,  an introduction  of  a
revenue-yielding  tax  package  should  only  be considered  if  expenditures  are
efficiently  spent  and  all  low-priority  programs  are  eliminated.
Background
2.  Central  American  economies  are  very  open,  with  exports  and  imports
accounting  for  a substantial  share  of GDP  compared  to other  countries  at
the  same  level  of development.  The resource  endowments  of  each  country  in
the  Region  are  not  as  homogeneous  as  would  appear  based  on a cursory
examination.  Land/population  ratio,  for  example,  is  more favorable  in
Honduras  compared  to  El Salvador. Forest  resources  are  relatively  abundant
in  Honduras  and in  Costa  Rica  compared  to  El Salvador. Costa  Rica's
literacy  rate  is  the  highest  in the  Region,  and  hence  its  workforce  is
better  educated. However,  literacy  rates  in  other  countries  are  low
compared  to  most  other  Latin  American  countries. On the  other  hand,  all
countries  have  a comparative  advantage  in  traditional  agriculture,  although
each  country  has  a different  combination  of traditional  products  (i.e.
coffee,  bananas,  sugar,  cotton,  and  cocoa  etc).
3.  The  degree  of resource  mobilization  in the  Region  is inadequate,
with low  tax  to  GDP  ratios  (with  the  exception  of Costa  Rica)  compared  to
countries  at similar  GDP  per  capita  levels. Tax systems  are  rudimentary.
Financial  disequilibrium  of the  public  sectors  is  the  norm,  as evidenced  by
large--although  declining--public  sector  deficits  and  domestic  financing  of
those  deficits,  leading  to  domestic  inflationary  pressures. Furthermore,
in  all  the  countries  in  Central  America,  the  elasticity  of the  tax  system
is low. As a result,  growth  in  tax  revenues  has lagged  behind  that  of
income  and  GDP in  the  recent  past.
II.  INTEGRATION  ISSUES
A.  Economic  Integration
4.  The  objective  of  harmonization  of tax  systems  is to facilitate
economic  integration  among  countries  joining  a  common  market. As explained-2-
below,  there  are  essentially  five  different  forms  of economic  integration.
CACM fits  into  the  definition  of a customs  union  (ii  below)  rather  than  a
common  market  (iii  below). Economic  integration  is intended  to  expand
trade  among  member  countries  as  well as to  encourage  deeper
industrialization  by permitting  the  utilization  of scale  economies  in
production.  The  following  is  a description  of different  forms  of
integration:
(i)  Free  Trade  Area:  Tariffs  are  abolished  among  member
countries,  but  each  country  retains  its  tariffs  on imports
from  non-member  countries.
(ii)  Customs  Union: In addition  to abolishing  tariffs  on trade
among  member  countries  as in (i)  above,  countries  also
adopt  a common  external  tariff  for  imports  from  non-member
countries.
(iii)  Common  Market: Common  market  is  based  on a free  trade
among  member  countries  and  a common  external  tariff  for
imports  from  non-member  countries  as in (ii)  above  plus  a
free  movement  of factors  of production  (i.e.  labor  and
capital).
(iv)  Economic  Union: In addition  to free  trade  and  free
movement  of factors  of  production  among  the  member
countries  as  well  as a common  external  tariff  (iii  above),
member  countries  harmonize  economic  policies  (a  la
COMECON). In  particular,  fiscal,  monetary  and  exchange
rate  policies  are  closely  coordinated  and  harmonized  among
the  member  countries.
(v)  Total  Economic  Integration:  In addition  to  having  all  the
attributes  of  an economic  union,  total  economic
integration  requires  an  establishment  of a supernational
authority,  which  determines  economic  policies  for  all  the
member  countries. Decisions  of this  entity  would  be
binding  on all  countries.
5.  Integration  among  various  countries  is  prevalent  in  the  world
today. The  Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  is  one  of several  such
integration  efforts. Other  integration  efforts  include: European  Economic
Community  (EEC):  the  Committee  on Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (COMECON)  for
the  Centrally  Planned  Economies  'n  Eastern  Europe;  European  Free  Trade
Association  for  north  European  nations;  the  Latin  American  Free  Trade
Association  and  the  Andean  Group  for  South  American  countries;  the
Caribbean  Community;  the  free-trade  agreement  between  the  United  States  and
Israel;  the  Association  of South  East  Asia  Nations  (ASEAN)  that  seeks  free
trade  among  the  six  nations  of that  region;  the  recently  concluded  free-
trade  agreements  between  Australia  and  New Zealand,  and  between  the  U.S.A.
and  Canada.B.  CACM (Central  American  Common  Market)
6.  Based  on the  premise  that  the  strategy  of autarky  is  not  a viable
development  option,  the  five  countries  in  Central  America  established  a
Customs  Union  in 1960. Integration  helped  accelerate  the industrialization
of the  Region. However,  industrialization  did  not  go beyond  the  easy  stage
of  consumer  goods  production  (i.e.  mostly  food  and  textiles).  The  trade
diversion  that  this  integration  caused  also  led  to  a  welfare  loss,  as the
prices  of most  import-substitutes  were  higher  than  their  international
equivalents.  After  the  mid-1970s,  the  Customs  Union  lost  its  dynamism,
with  Honduras  leaving,  following  a  war  with  El Salvador. The  sharp
increase  in  intra-regional  trade  in  the  early  19809  resulted  from  heavy
purchases  by Nicaragua  to rebuild  its  internal  war-damaged  economy. But
the  expansion  in trade  proved  unsustainable  as Nicaragua  could  not  pay  all
its  debts  to other  CACH  members. As a result,  the  CACM  member  countries
sharply  reduced  their  trade  with  Nicaragua. Coupled  with the  fall  in  GDP
per  capita  in  the  Region,  the  accumulated  unpaid  Nicaraguan  debt  to  other
member  countries  led  to  a reduction  in  intra-regional  trade  after  1983. As
a  result,  intra-regional  trade,  after  peaking  at  US$1.1  billion  in 1980,
fell  to  US$757  million  in 1983.
7.  The  present  challenge  confronting  the  policymakers  in  Central
America  is  to transform  the  Union  to  a  modern  common  market. This  could
only  be achieved  through  a strong  reform  of the  tariff  regime. This  report
describes  an action  plan  to achieve  this  objective. It does  not  analyze
political  feasibility  of the  recommended  actions,  and  assumes  that  they  are
feasible. It is important  to  note,  however,  that  at this  juncture,  options
to  grow  out  of the  present  macroeconomic  problems  are limited  and  hence  the
timely  introduction  of reforms  is  vital  to regain  high  growth  rates
recorded  by the  countries  in the  Region  in  the  past.
8.  Given  that  the  economic  costs  of implementing  an import-
substitution  strategy  are  higher  the  smaller  the  size  of a  country,  CACM
attempted  to implement  this  strategy  on a regional  basis. However,  the
enlarged  regional  market  proved  to  be too  small  for  most  products,  given
the  larger  economies  of scale  needed  for  economic  operations.  Hence,  the
integration  of the  regional  economies  to the  world  economy  is  essential  for
ensuring  the  viability  of the  customs  Union. This  requires  that  Union
members  accelerate  the  process  underway  in  reducing  the  level  and
dispersion  of effective  protection.
9.  The  Customs  Union  appears  to  be in  disarray. First,  Honduras
pulled  out  from  the  Union,  following  its  war  with  El Salvador  in  1967  and
did  not  join  the  Union  thereafter,  conducting  its  trade  with  other  CACM
members  through  bilateral  treaties. Second,  following  the  1979  revolution,
Nicaragua  shifted  to a centrally-managed  economy,  therefore,  tariffs  became
irrelevant  for  protection  purposes  in  Nicaragua. Also,  financial
difficulties  faced  by  Nicaragua  resulted  in  a large  increase  in  arrears  on
its  regional  trade  with other  countries  ir.  the  Customs  Union. Third,  El
Salvador  has  been  going  through  a difficult  period  of internal  warfare,
with  a consequent  adverse  impact  on production,  investment  and  on its
balance  of  payments. These  factors  coupled  with  the  unresolved  issue  of
ensuring  equitable  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits  from  integration
among  the  member  countries  have  resulted  in a  weakened  Customs  Union.-4-
10.  To achieve  a smooth  functioning  of trade  within  a common  market
with partners  of  unequal  wealth  and  productive  capacity,  a  number  of
conditions  need  to  be fulfilled.  First,  the  impact  of trade  creation
should  outweigh  that  of trade  diversion. Second,  related  to the  first
point,  large  trade  imbalances  among  member  countries  may  not  be sustainable
over  long  periods  of time  and  countries  shot l  take  measures  to reduce  them
to sustainable  levels  (i.e.  through  deflati%.iary  domestic  policies  and
appropriate  use  of the  exchange  rate). Third,  indirect  taxes  on  domectic
transactions  should  be harmonized  among  the  member  countries  to ensure  that
these  taxes  are  not  used  to counterbal&nce  or negate  the  commonality  of the
external  tariff. Fourth,  having  a common  external  tariff  implies  that  all
tariffs  on imports  should  be the  same  for  all  member  countries. Fifth,
common  external  tariffs  should  cover  all  product  categories  and
quantitative  import  restrictions  should  be phased  out.  Sixth,
harmonization  of  national  policies  is  also  an essential  ingredient  in  the
successful  functioning  of a  common  market. Specifically,  harmonization  of
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  management  of the  exchange  rate  are
essential. Otherwise,  with  widely  varying  exchange  rate  and  domestic
policies,  countries  may opt  to  use  tariffs  as an instrument  to  achieve
their  domestic  objectives.  For  example,  expansionary  domestic  policies
under  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime  could  lead  to the  distortionary  use  of
tariffs  to  protect  the  balance  of payments. For  example,  Costa  Rica
heightened  existing  surcharges  and  established  new  ones  on imports  in  the
early  1980s  to  protect  its  balance  of  payments  as expansionary  domestic
policies  under  the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  led  to  an overvaluation  of
its  currency  as domestic  inflation  accelerated.  Seventh,  for  the  common
market  to  be successful,  all  members,  including  the  relatively  weaker  ones
should  be given  incentives  to stay  within  the  common  market. Hence,
countries  with  higher  levels  of  wealth  and  productive  capacity  should  help
countries  with  more limited  levels  of  wealth  and  productive  capacity.
Eighth,  there  has  to be a legal  framework  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  the
common  market. Lastly,  Governments  should  accept  the  fact  that  membership
in  a common  market  implies  foregoing  part  of their  power  of  unilaterally
determining  domestic  policies.
11.  The  creation  of the  CACM  gave  rise  to  a number  of important
structural  changes. First,  it led  to  a large  increase  in the  share  of
industry  in  GDP.  For  most  of the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  growth  of industry
outstripped  GDP  growth  by a  wide  margin,  while  agriculture  grew  slower  than
overall  GDP.  Growth  of industry  was  also  facilitated  by the  expansion  in
manufactured  exports  mostly  to the  regional  market. As a result,  trade
within  the  CACM--mostly  manufactured  goods--grew  rapidly. These
developments  also  led  to  a structural  shift  in  the  composition  of imports,
with intermediate  and  capital  goods  imports  increasing  and  final  consumer
goods  imports  decreasing.  The  openness  of  economies  in  Central  America
rose,  paralleling  the  expansion  in  exports  to  CACM  and  in imports  of
intermediate  and  capital  goods.
12.  There  is  a  need to review  the  extent  to  which  the  creation  of  CACM
led  to trade  creation  and/or  trade  diversion. On an  apriori  basis,  it
could  be assumed  that  trade  was diverted  in final  consumer  goods,  while  it
was created  for  intermediate  and  capital  goods  for  the  Region  as a  whole.-5-
13.  The  agricultural  sectors  in the  Region  face  a number  of issues.
coffee  and  bananas  are  the  most important  commodities  in  export  agriculture
in  virtually  all  the  countries  in  the  Region. Coffee  exports  are  regulated
under  the  International  Coffee  Agreement.  btagnation  in  world  demand  kept
production  increases  to low  levels  despite  yield  improvements  in coffee.
In fact,  Costa  Rica's  yields  are  one  of the  highest  in  the  world. Cyclical
changes  in  coffee  prices  exerted  an important  impact  on  money  incomes. The
large  increase  in  coffee  prices  during  1976-77  and  in 1986  provided  large
windfall  foreign  exchange  revenues. Banana  exports,  however,  grew  very
slowly. Because  of labor  problems  and  increases  in transport  costs.  one
international  banana  company  left  Costa  Rica.  Other  traditional  products,
such  as cotton,  sugar,  and  cocoa  faced  difficulties  as a result  of reduced
international  prices,  increases  in  costs  and  management  problems. Overall,
the  performance  of export  agriculture  has  been  mixed. On the  other  hand,
basic  grains  production  increased,  benefiting  from  quantitative  import
restrictions  and  generous  price  and interest  rate  subsidies  and  credit
allocation  schemes,  which  favored  basic  grains  production  such  as in  Costa
Rica.  In  particular,  rice  production  grew  substantially  because  of yield
improvements  based  on new  technology.  However,  since  basic  grains
production  is  high-cost  in  the  Region,  rice  had  to  be exported  at  a loss,
subsidized  by the  public  sector  as in the  case  of  Costa  Rica. As a result,
the  increase  in  basic  grains  production  was  obtained  at substantial
economic  and  fiscal  costs.
C.  Review  of Experience  In Central  America
14.  The  experience  in  Central  America  as outlined  above  did  not
respcad  to  the  requirements  for  a  well-functioning  common  market. First,
the  trade  diversion  effect  appears  to  have  dominated  trade  creation. There
have  been some  calculations  on trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  by  Mr.
Larry  Wilmore. These  calculations  confirm  that  trade  diversion  dominated
trade  creation  in the  CACM.  This  has  had significant  implications  for
countries  which  have  a relatively  undeveloped  productive  capacity  for
exports. For  example,  within  the  common  market,  Honduras  would  import  a
large  share  of its  requirements  for  final  consumer  goods  from  other  Common
Market  member  countries  at prices  higher  than  international  prices,  leading
to a  net loss  of foreign  exchange  on its  balance  of  payments. For  a
country  like  Honduras  with a large  disequilibrium  in its  balance  of
payments,  this  presents  a serious  problem. However,  it  is difficult  to
quantify  the  exact  trade  diversion  and  creation  effects  with  any  degree  of
precision  without  undertaking  a serious  study.
15.  Second.  large  imbalences  have  occurred  among  the  CACM  member
countries  in  their  trade  with  each  other  since  1980. For  example,  by  year
end-1986,  Costa  Rica's  creditor  balances  with other  counties  amounted  to
over  US$350  million. A large  part  of this  imbalance  in  trade  resulted  from
Nicaragua's  lack  of payments  for  its  net  debtor  balances. Nicaragua
stepped  up its  imports  from  other  CACM  member  countries  in 1980-81,
following  destruction  of some  of its  productive  capacity  after  the  1979
revolution.  However,  since  the  country  ran  into  balance  of  payments
problems,  it  has accumulated  large  arrears  with the  rest  of the  CACH  member
countries,  and  could  not sustain  the  same  level  of  demand.- 6 -
16.  Third,  member  countries  resorted  zo  establishing  different  rates
for  domestic  transaction  taxes  on goods  imported  from  other  CACM  members
compared  to  non-member  countries. Differential  rates  of consumption  taxes
were used  to raise  protection  over  and  above  those  provided  by impoat
tariffs  and  surcharges.
17.  Fourth,  member  countries  also  established  additional  charges  on
imports--which  are  not  applied  uniformly  by all  member  countries. These
charges  were sometimes  applied  to imports  from  other  CACM  member  countries.
The  imposition  of thcse  additional  charges  on imports  implied  the  break-up
of the  common  external  tariff  for  most  products: it  assigned  different
nominal  and  hence  effective  protection  rates  to  various  industries  in  each
member  country  and  violated  the  principle  of free  trade  among  the  member
countries. Furthermore,  some  countries  also  used  the  exchange  rate  as  a
tool  for  protection  against  imports  from  other  CACM  members.
18.  Fifth,  some  product  categories  were  excluded  from  the  common
external  tariff,  leading  to  a  weakening  of the  customs  union's  instruments.
For  example,  trade  in basic  grains  was  regulated  in  each  country  through
the  implementation  of  quantitative  import  restrictions  and importation  by a
public  sector  marketing  agency. This  arrangement  effectively  ruled  out  the
use  of a common  external  tariff  on  agricultural  products. Furthermore,
member  countries  excluded  some  final  consumer  goods  from  the  common
external  tariff,  and  assigned  higher  tariff  rates  for  these  products  as
discussed  in the  section  on import  tariffs. The  intention  of the
authorities  in  the  Region  is  to reach  an agreement  quickly  on common  rates
for  these  products. Given  the  importance  of these  products  in domestic
production  (i.e.  they  account  for  about  one-third  to  one-fourth  of domestic
production  in  Costa  Rica),  this  exclusion  clearly  weakens  the  customs
Union. Given  that  most  of these  products  are  not competitive,  this
exclusion  and  the  increased  nominal  rates  reversed  some  of the  benefits  of
the  tariff  reform.
19.  Sixth,  although  an effort  has  been  made in the  past  to  coordinate
national  economic  policies,  no concrete  result  has  yet  been  obtained  on
overall  policy  coordination,  with  countries  following  divergent  monetary,
fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policies. Clearly,  those  policies  reflect  not
only  policymakers'  divergent  objectives,  but  they  also  show  diverse  social,
political  and  economic  conditions  in  each  country. For  example,  given  the
political  difficulties  in raising  revenues,  Guatemala  has  generally
preferred  to follow  contractionary  domestic  policies  by cutting
expenditures  to confront  short-term  financial  difficulties  in  the  recent
past. Costa  Rica,  on the  other  hand,  has  opted  to increase  revenues  for
the  same  purpose. Furthermore,  management  of the  exchange  rate  has  not
been  coordinated  among  member  countries. Frequent  changes  in  exchange  rate
management  coupled  with the  development  of parallel  markets  has  made  policy
coordination  difficult.
20.  Seventh,  to speed  up development  in the  Region  and,  particulLrly,
to  help  Honduras  (the  country  perceived  not  to  benefit  from  integration  in
the  Customs  Union)  a Regional  Development  Bank,  CABEI,  was established.
But, financial  difficulties  did  not  permit  CABEI  to  play  the role  envisaged
for  it  since  its  inception.  A study  underway  in  the  World  Bank  for  CABEI
would  presumably  propose  a plan  of  action  to  help  promote  an equitable
distribution  of the  development  effort  in the  Region.-7-
21.  Eighth,  no legal  body  was  created  to  monitor  compliance  with the
rules  of the  Customs  Union. Lastly,  each  country  preferred  to set  its  own
domestic  policies,  sometimes  at  cross  purposes  with the  policies  of the
rest  of the  member  countries. The  end  result  of all  these  policies  has
been  a  we&kened  Customs  Union.
22.  The  following  attributes  are  needed  for  a  well-functioning  commo.z
market:
(i)  The  net  effect  of trade  creation  should  outweigh  trade
diversion;
(il)  large  imbalances  in intra-trade  should  be avoided  through
the  use  of appropriate  domestic  policy  instruments  as  well
as  by the  appropriate  use  of the  exchange  rate;
(iii)  indirect  taxes  on domestic  transactions  should  be
harmonized  among  member  countries;
(iv)  all  charges  .n  imports,  except  the  common  external  tariff,
should  be eliminated;
(v)  The  CACM  common  external  tariff  should  also  cover
agricultural  products  and  should  be the  only  means  of
import  protection,  while  quantitative  import  restrictionsi
should  be phased  out;
(vi)  All  CACM  countries  should  make  an effort  to coordinate
their  domestic  policies  and  the  management  of their
exchange  rates;
(vii)  CABEI  should  be revitalized  to  help the  development
effort,  especially  for  countries  with  weaker
infrastructures;
(viii) a legal  framework  for  the  functioning  of the  system  has to
be prepared  and  put  into  place  to ensure  compliance  with
the  rules  of the  Common  Market;  and
(ix)  all  countries  should  accept  the  fact  that  integration  to  a
Comn:on  Market  implies  a  partial  surrender  of their
national  sovereignty  in determ3ning  domestic  policies.
III. HARMONIZATION  ISSUES
23.  Harmonization  of a tax  system  implies  uniformity  in taxes,  bases
and rates  as  well as  compatibility  in tax  structures.  Harmonization  of
taxes  is  an essential  component  of any  common  market. While  uniformity  of
taxes  is  desirable  in intercommodity  relationships,  this  is  not  the  case  in
inter-country  relationships.  As the  example  of the  EEC  indicates,  a  Common
Market  can  function  with different  tax  rates. In  Central  America,  CACM
member  countries  aimed  at  harmonizing  only  import  tariffs  and  some  fiscal
incentives  at the  inception  of the  Common  Market  in 1960. Ov.!r  time,
member  countries  began  to restrict  regional  trade  as  well,  applying
different  tariff  rates  on some  products  traded  with  third  countries  through- 8 -
the  imposition  of surcharges  (i.e.  Costa  Rica). Within  the  context  of the
19d6  trade  reform,  member  countrips  decided  to set  different  rates  for  a
selected  group  of commodities,  diverging  even  further  from  the  rule  of the
commonality  of the  import  tar.Cf  rates  among  the  member  countries.  Within
this  context,  the  recommendations  of this  report  !n  advocating  a deeper
harmonization  effort  may seem  far-fetched.  Clearly,  the  aim  of this  report
is  not  to analyze  whether  harmonization  of tax  systems  in  Central  America
would  make sense. This  topic  would  need  to  be addressed  in  a separate
report.
24.  General  principles  needed  for  the  harmonization  of tax  policies  in
the  Region  include  the  following:
(i)  continuing  trade  liberalization  already  started  through
reducing  the  level  arnd  dispersion  in  effective  protection;
(ii)  shifting  reliance  from  trade  to domestic  transaction
taxes;
(iii)  making  the  value  added  tax  cum  selective  consumption  taxes
the  backbone  of the  tax  system  and  harmonizing  those  taxes
among  member  countries;
(iv)  harmonizing  taxes  on inputs  and  exempting  non-traditional
exporters  from  the  payment  of import  duties  on inputs;
(v)  moving  in  tie  direction  of coordinating  taxes  on factor
incomes  (i.e.  personal  income,  corporate  income,  property
and  land  taxes,  taxes  on financial  gains)  to  avoid  double
taxation  and  the  provision  of competitive  tax  incentives
among  member  countries  and/or  using  factor  income  taxation
to  discriminate  against  nationals  of other  countries;
(vi)  eliminating  export  taxes  on  non-traditional  exports
outside  the  CACM;
(vii)  eliminating  all  quantitative  import  restrictions,  prior
import  deposits,  non-common  import  tariffs  and  other
restrictions  on imports  from  other  CACM  member  countries;
(viii) applying  similar  principles  in  designing  export  taxes  to
coffee  and  bananas;
(ix)  not  using  differential  exchange  rates  to  discriminate
regional  trade;  and
(x)  improving  tax  administration.
A.  Overview  of tax  systems  in  Central  America
25.  The tax  systems  in  Central  America  face  a  number  of issues. A
large  share  of the  taxes,  which  provides  the  bulk  of  Government  revenues  in
the  Region,  is indirect  leading  to low  elasticity  of the  tax  system. Over
half  of the  indirect  taxes  are  on trade. Some  taxes  on trade  discourage-9-
exports. Large  price  fluctuations  make  the  system  highly  vulnerable  to
ex.ogenous  shocks. Variability  in receipts  makes  it  difficult  for  the
authorities  to  plan  public  expenditures.  Most taxes  have  high  rates,  but
narrow  bases. Unttil  recently,  most  excise  taxes  were also  specific,
leading  to reduced  collection  as domestic  inflation  rose. In fact,
domestic  inflation  has  eroded  collection  from  specific  taxes  dramatically
in  the  last  eight  years. Furthermore,  a large  number  of exemptions  under
most taxes  are  unnecessarily  high  and  hence  they  reduce  the  taxable  income
base  and  necessitate  higher  rates  on reduced  bases. Another  issue  is  the
inefficient  collection  procedures  which  result  in  considerable  losses  of
fiscal  revenues. As there  is  a large  discrepancy  between  statutory  and
effective  tax  systems,  the  tax  collection  effort  in  Central  America  leaves
much to be  desired.
26.  There  are  other  problems. First,  the  existence  of a large  number
of nuisance  taxes  increases  the  cost  of collection  while  not  yielding  much
revenue. Second,  there  are  a  r.umber  of taxes  on the  same  base,  creating
distortions  and  reducing  the  efficiency  of tax  administration.  Third,  some
revenues  are  earmarked  to  be spent  in  predetermined  ways for  pre-determined
agencies,  reducing  the  flexibility  in  assigning  budgetary  resources.
Fourth,  frequent  changes  in  the  tax  systems  create  uncertainty.
27.  Some  observations  can  be  made  base  on an examination  of  changes  in
ratios  of  main  categories  of taxes  as a share  of GDP  during  1982-87.
First,  two  countries--Costa  Rica  and  Honduras--raised  their  tax  ratios
during  the  period  through  increasing  taxes  on domestic  transactions  and
introducing  additional  surcharges  on imports. Second,  the  reliance  on
income  taxes  do not  show  any  correlation  with  the  levels  of income. The
poorest  country  in  the  Region,  Honduras,  collects  three  times  as  much
revenue--as  a share  of  GDP--from  income  taxes  than  Guatemala. Third,  it is
important  to  note  the  dismal  impact  of the  tax  reform  introduced  in
Guatemala  in  1983  on tax  revenues. This  underscores  the  need to  ensure
that  any  rationalization  effort  should  respond  to the  need  for  generating
sufficient  levels  of revenues. In fact,  despite  the  coffee  boom in  1986,
tax  revenues  as a share  of GDP  in  Guatemala  were lower  in  1986  than  in
1982--a  year  before  the  introduction  of the  reform. Fourth,  the
substantial  impact  of  coffee  prices  on tax  revenues  can  be  observed  in  El
Salvador  during  1986-87. As coffee  prices  declined  in  1986,  the  drop  in
coffee  revenues  of about  3? of  GDP  caused  the  tax  ratio  to fall  from  13.1Z
in  1986  to  9.7Z in  1987.
28.  Tax  Ratios. Table  I shows  tax  ratios  (tax  revenues/GDP)  for  all
Central  American  countries  for  a few  selected  years. As the  table
indicates,  rates  range  from  5.62  of  GDP in  Guatemala  in  1984  to  16.2Z  in
Costa  Rica  in  1985. In fact,  tax  ratios  in  Guatemala  and  El Salvador  are
two  of the  lowest  in the  Western  Hemisphere.
29.  As countries  develop,  tax  bases  grow  more than  proportionately
than  the  growth  of income. Other  factors  such  as  the  level  of urbanization
facilitates  tax  collection.  Hence,  tax  ratios  should  increase  over  time.
It is  important  to  note  that  each  country  in the  Region  feels  pressure  to
raise  different  levels  of revenues  based  on their  levels  of  public
expenditures,  their  possibilities  of financing  deficits  as  well  as the- 10  -
level  of their  non-tax  revenues. Certainly,  the  upper  limit  of taxation
could  be considered  to  be that  level  beyond  which  taxation  would  tend  to
reduce  economic  growth. It is  not  possible  to state  when  that  ratio  would
be reached  in  Central  America,  but  comparative  ratios  indicate  that
Guatemala  and  El Salvador  could  increase  their  tax  ratios  in a significant
way  without  reaching  that  limit  in  the  next  couple  of years.
Table  I:  Central  America: Tax  Ratios,  1983-86
(Tax  Revenues/GDP)
1983  1984  1985  1986
Costa  Rica  15.9  15.7  16.2  14.0
Honduras  12.1  14.0  14.7  13.7
El Salvador  10.6  11.6  11.3  12.1
Guatemala  6.1  5.6  6.1  7.1
Source: IMF.
30.  Various  factors  play  an important  role  in  determining  the  tax
ratio: political  willingness  to raise  revenues  as a stabilization  tool,
the  magnitide  of the  taxable  base,  the  number  of exemptions,  forcefulness
of tax  administrations,  the  rate  structure,  changes  in  economic  activity,
the  degree  of  urbanization,  the  level  of  monetization  of the  economy,  per
capita  incomes,  and  the  degree  of  openness  of the  economy. Given  the
diversity  of the  economies  and  differences  in some  of the  above-noted
variables--along  with similarities  such  as inadequate  tax  administration  in
all  the  countries--the  large  range  of the  tax  ratios  in the  Region  is
understandable.  No effort  is  made in  this  report  to explain  the  different
tax  ratios  by changes  in  the  above  mentioned  variables. It is  important  to
note,  however,  that  given  the  different  degrees  of the  need for
stabilization  and  development  in each  country,  harmonization  of taxes  will
likely  lead  to less  than  a smooth  path  of transition  and  it should  be
consistent  with the  different  levels  of tax  ratios  in  each  country.
B.  Overall  Recommendations  to Reform  the
Tax  Systems  in  Central  America
31.  This  report  suggests  that  the  taxation  systems  in  Central  America
should  be restructured  along  the  lines  discussed  below. First,  there  is  a
need for  rationalizing  tax  systems  by converting  specific  to  ad-valorem
base  and  phasing  out  exemptions--except  for  imported  inputs  used  for  non-
traditional  exports  outside  the  CACM.  Second,  distortion  costs  should  be
minimized  and  taxation  should  be used  to  strengthen  allocative  efficiency
by encouraging  the  growth  of sectors  in  which  Central  American  countries- 11  -
have  an apparent  comparative  advantage.  The reliance  of the  tax  systems
should  also  be shifted  from  production  to  consumption-based  taxes. Fourth,
administrative  costs  should  be reduced. Any  revision  in  the  tax  system
should  aim  at reducing  collection  costs  as  well as  compliance  costs  for
taxpayers. For  example,  it is  not  desirable  to design  complicated  taxes,
which  would lead  taxpayers  to rearrange  their  financial  affairs  in such  a
way as to  avoid  payment  of trxes. Hence,  effective  tax  systems  should  be
approximated  to statutory  systems. Fifth,  changes  should  be designed  to
provide  progressivity  to the  tax  system  in  order  to ensure  vertical  equity
to the  extent  possible. Sixth,  a large  share  of total  tax  revenue  should
be  derived  from  few  taxes  and  tax  rates. Seventh,  structural  rigidities  in
tax  systems,  such  as the  practice  of earmarking  of revenues  for  particular
uses  or groups.  should  be phased  out. Lastly,  frequent  changes  in the  tax
system  should  be avoided.
32.  As discussed  earlier  in the  report,  tax  ratios,  with the  exception
of Costa  Rica,  are  low  in  the  Region. Two  obvious  options  to increase  the
ratio  would  be to improve  collection  and  phase  out  most  exemptions.
Furthermore,  there  is scope  for  increasing  revenues  on imports  and
consumption.  Through  these  efforts,  taxable  income  could  be approximated
to its  potential  base. However,  it is  important  to  note  that  tax  increases
should  not  be recommended  unless  there  are  worthy  expenditures.  Otherwise,
the  supply  side  effects  of  higher  taxes  may  have  a  welfare  cost  that
exceeds  the  welfare  gains  of  higher  expenditures.
33.  Regarding  minimizing  distortions,  the  most significant  issue
relates  to  trade  taxes  as discussed  in  the  rest  of this  report.
Particularly,  a reduction  in  effective  protection  through  further  tariff
reform  is  discussed. A decrease  in  exemptions  and  deductions  is  also
needed  to  avoid  applying  higher  rates  on the  remaining  lowered  bases.
Furthermore,  shifting  the  reliance  from  production  to  consumption  taxes
will  be needed  to decrease  disincentives  to  work and  reduce  variability  in
receipts. Lastly,  payroll  taxes  need  to  be minimized  to avoid  discouraging
employment  and  output. Efficiency,  on the  other  hand,  could  be  encouraged
by low  marginal  tax  rates.
34.  Overall  obiectives  of a taxation  system. Any  action  plan to
rationalize  the  tax  systems  in the  Region  should  aim  at the  following:
(i)  generating  adequate  government  revenues;
(ii)  minimizing  adverse  effects  on incentives  and  distortions
and  encouraging  resource  allocation  based  on comparative
advantage;
(iii)  encouraging  efficiency,  output  and  employment  growth  as
well  as savings;  and
(iv)  reducing  variability  in  collection  to  provide  better
programming  of  expenditures  and  to  avoid  a sharp  increase
in  public  sector  deficits  when terms  of trade  worsen.- 12 -
C.  Structure  of Taxes
1.  Indirect  Taxes.
1.1.  Taxes  on International  Trade
35.  Empirical  investigations  show  that  taxes  on foreign  trade  account
for  5.6Z  of GDP  and  over  one-third  of total  tax  revenues  in  developing
countries. In fact,  import  duties  comprise  the  most important  taxable  base
in developing  countries,  given  that  they  do  not  require  a very
sophisticated  tax  administration.  In  open  economies,  such  as those  in
Central  America,  the  significance  of taxes  on foreign  trade  is  larger
(Table  II). However,  the  significance  of taxes  on trade  should  decline
over  time  as the  share  of taxes  collected  on domestic  transactions  in  GDP
increases.
Table  II:  Share  of Taxes  on International  Trade
in  Total  Central  Government  Revenues,  1975,  80,  84
(2)
1975  1980  1984
World  4.8  5.1  4.4
Industrial  Countries  1.8  1.5  1.4
Developing  Countries  14.1  16.1  14.0
Non-Oil  Developing
Countries  15.5  17.4  14.6
LAC  10.8  14.4  8.3
Asia  19.5  20.1  20.1
Source: IMF,  UNDP.
1.1.1. Import  Tariffs
36.  Empirical  investigations  show  that  import  duties  contribute  about
4.52  of  GDP  and  over  one-fourth  of total  tax  revenues  in developing
countries,  although  there  is  considerable  variation  in their  reiative
importance  among  the  countries. It is  also  a  known  fact  that  all  the  great
users  of taxes  on imports  make little  use  of taxes  on  domestic  transactions
and  conversely  virtually  all  the  great  users  of domestic  transaction  taxes
on goods  and  services  make lit.le  use  of import  duties.
37.  Import  tariffs  are  used  mostly  to generate  revenue. But  those
taxes  are  also  utilized  to  provide  protection  to  domestic  industries,
reduce  imports  and  discourage  consumption.
38.  In  open  economies,  high  tariff  protection  could  result  in  the
misallocation  of resources  in  the  economy. Resources  could  move into- 13  -
sectors  in  which  countries  do not  have  a comparative  advantage.
Furthermore,  during  balance  of  payments  crises,  tariffs  could  also  be  used
as a substitute  for  devaluation  and  hence  help  postpone  needed  adjustment
efforts.
39.  The  CACM  framework  establishes  the  import  tariff  regime. This
framework  consists  of  a Common  External  Tariff  (CET)  on imports  from
countries  outside  the  CACM,  while  exempting  import  duties  for  regional
trade. The  rate  structure  is  complex  and  is  based  on the  principle  of
made-to-measure  protection  by assigning  higher  nominal  rates  to regionally
produced  goods.
40.  Previous  studies  conducted  for  the  countries  in the  Region  have
indicated  that  prices  of importables  have  been  higher  than  their  domestic
equivalents,  showing  the  impact  of  trade  protection. Furthermore,  tariffs
have  been  used  as an instrument  for  protecting  the  balance  of payments.
For  example,  the  San  Jose  protocol  surcharge  was established  by all  the
CACH  countries  (i.e.  equal  to  30%  of  the  Common  External  Tariff)  in  1975
when the  Region  was facing  acute  balance  of  payments  difficulties.  These
surcharges  also  helped  raise  revenue  to  compensate  for  the  reduction  in
tariff  revenues  from  imports--caused  by the  introduction  of incentive
policies  of the  CACH. Additionally,  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras  set  up  high
surcharges  on imports  in  the  early  1980s,  when terms  of trade  for  the
Region  worsened.
41.  The  rate  structure  is  designed  to  provide  protection  to regionally
produced  goods. First,  higher  rates  are  applied  to final  consumer  goods.
Second,  lower  rates  are  assigned  to intermediate  and  capital  goods,  with
relatively  higher  rates  on regionally  produced  intermediate  and  capital
goods. Third,  generous  tax  exemptions  are  provided  for  non-regionally
produced  raw  materials,  intermediate  and  capital  goods. Some "essential
goods"  (i.e.  wheat)  are  either  exempt  from  the  payment  of import  duties  or
are  taxed  at low  rates.
42.  Before  the  introduction  of the  reform  on January  1, 1986,  CET
included  both  an ad-valorem  and  a specific  component. With  increasing
international  inflation,  the  specific  component  of the  import  tariffs
declined  over  the  years. Following  the  introduction  of the  reform  of the
tariff  regime,  all  rates  on imports  were  converted  into  ad-valorem  rates.
Issues
43.  Honduras  is  not a legal  member  of the  CACM.  It left  the  Customs
Union  after  a  war  with El  Salvador  in  1967. Since  then,  it  has  traded  with
the  other  CACH  members  mostly  on the  basis  of  bilateral  treaties. Being
the  least  developed  country  in  the  Region,  Honduras  has  demanded  special
favors  from  other  CACM  members.
44.  As the  Region  began  to face  balance  of  payments  difficulties,  each
country  introduced  restrictions  on their  trade,  including  trade  within  the
CACM.  First,  following  the  overvaluation  of  currencies  after  1981,
parallel  markets  for  foreign  exchange  developed  in  most of these  countries.
Quantitative  restrictions  on imports  were  established,  while  foreign
exchange  restrictions  were intensified.  Costa  Rica  also  imposed  surcharges
on imports  and  Honduras  raised  import  surcharge  rates.- 14  -
45.  Costa  Rica's  surcharges  on imports  served  several  purposes. Those
on inputs  and  capital  goods  (2Z  - 52 - 10Z)  and  low  rates  on final  consumer
goods  (12.5X)  were designed  for  revenue  purposes. Higher  rates  on final
consumer  goods  (402  - 50?)  were  designed  to  provide  protection  for
regionally  produced  goods,  while  higher  rates  on final  consumer  goods  (i.e.
.OOZ  and  2002  in 1984)  were intended  to reduce  or avoid  imports.
46.  Nicaragua's  new  econemic  direction  after  1980  presents  a
challenge. Since  the  country  switched  to  a centrally  managed  economy,  the
significance  of tariffs  in resource  allocation  and  1i regulating  trade
became  irrelevant.  As the  country  faced  enormous  balance  of payments
difficulties,  cther  CACM  member  countries  reduced  their  trade  with
Nicaragua  to low  levels  to ensure  that  their  creditor  balances  do not
increase  further  as discussed  earlier  in  this  report.
47.  Countries  in  the  Region  have  not  harmonized  their  import  regimes
for  basic  grains. In fact,  most  countries  maintain  quantitative  import
restrictions  on the  importation  of  basic  grains.
Results  of  high import  protection
48.  High import  tariffs  on final  consumer  goods  coupled  with low  rates
on non-regionally  produced  intermediate  and  capital  goods  led  to  high
effective  protection  rates  for  industrial  products. Quantitative
restrictions  on imports  of basic  grains  also resulted  in  high  effective
protection  for  basic  grains. Furthermore,  dispersion  in  nominal  rates  led
to even  larger  dispersion  in effective  rates.
49.  High  effective  protection  rates  led  to a  number  of results.
First,  it resulted  in  misallocation  of resources  by stimulating  the  growth
of sectors  in  which  the  countries  in the  Region  do  not  have  an  apparent
comparative  advantage. Even,  some  activities  with low  value  added  were
created,  indicating  inefficiency  and  waste. Most  domestic  prices  have  been
well over  their  international  price  equivalents.  Furthermore,  the  granting
cf exemptions  on imports  encouraged  high  capital  and  import-intensity  in
manufacturing  and  favored  the  creation  of low  employment  generating  jobs,
aggravating  the  already  serious  unemployment  problems  in these  countries.
50.  The  implementation  of the  tariff  regime  also  led  to  an expansion
in  the  share  of industry  in  the  economy. Before  the  CACM  was  created,
industry  accounted  for  a small  share  of  GDP in  all  the  countries  in the
Region. Following  the  creation  of the  Common  Market,  however,  this  share
rose  considerably.  The  sub-sectors  which  developed  rapidly  were  mostly
final  consumer  goods,  in  which  CACM  countries  presumably  have  comparative
advantage. However,  high  effective  protection  provided  to industry  did  not
create  incentives  for  firms  to  become  internationally  competitive. Import
substitution  in final  consumer  goods  should  not  create  a chronic  deficit  in
the  trade  balance  since  input  imports  are  generally  smaller  than  output
imports. As industry  developed  and  regional  imports  were  exempted  from  the
payment  of tariffs,  regional  trade  also  grew  substantially.  It  now
accounts  for  a little  less  then  one-fifth  of total  exports  in the  Region.
51.  Since  the  new  industries  which  developed  in response  to the
granting  of  new incentives  relied  heavily  on the  importation  of- 15  -
intermediate  and  capital  goods,  import  intensity  in  all  the  countries  rose
substantially.  This  created  a rigidity  in the  balance  of  payments,  since
reduction  in imports--during  a  balance  of  payment  crisis--depresses  output
and  employment. Furthermore,  heightened  import  intensity  in industry  led
to a chronic  deficit  in the  trade  balance  of the  industrial  sectors  in the
Region,  making  it  difficult  to adjust  to external  shocks.
52.  The implementation  of the  regional  tariff  regime  also  had  a
significant  impact  on the  structure  of imports. Following  the  creation  of
the  CACH,  and  the  consequent  sharp  growth  in the  industrial  sector--mostly
in final  consumer  goods--the  share  of consumer  goods  in  total  imports  fell,
while  the  share  of intermediate  and  capital  goods  imports  rose.
53.  Trade  policies  pursued  so far  have  been  successful  in  stimulating
industrial  development  based  otl  regional  import-substitution.  By the
early  1980s,  however,  the  possibilities  for  further  efficient  import-
substitution  have  been  virtually  exhausted. For  example,  the  production  of
many  consumer  goods  industries  was limited  in  Costa  Rica  before  it  joined
the  CACM. By 1980,  however,  imports  fell  to  about  one-tenth  of total
supply  in  many  consumer  goods  industries,  such  as in  food  products,
beverages,  tobacco,  clothing  and  furniture.
54.  The  anti-export  bias  of the  trade  regime. The  protection  system
discourages  the  growth  of exports. The  regional  tariff  regime  created  a
significant  bias  against  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM in  general  and
against  export  agriculture  in  particular,  where  the  Region's  comparative
advantage  lies. For  example,  in  Costa  Rica,  effective  protection  provided
to regional  import  substitution  activities  averaged  about  126%  in 1982
compared  to 15%  for  non-traditional  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM.
As a result,  the  growth  of  non-traditional  exports  outside  the  CACM  was
sluggish  in the  past.  Compared  with  other  small  sized  developing  countries
such  as  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore,  growth  of  non-traditional  exports  was  very
slow  in  the  recent  past.
55.  The  tariff  regime  also  led  to an erosion  of the  tax  base  on
imports. First,  imports  from  other  CACM  countries  were  exempted  from
duties. Second,  generous  tariff  exemptions  were  granted  to  intermediate
and  capital  goods. These  exemptions  led  to large  fiscal  losses,  averaging
about  52 of  GDP  a year  for  some  countries  in the  Region. Third,
prohibitively  high  tariffs  on final  consumer  goods  also  reduced  fiscal
revenues  by limiting  the  growth  of imports.
Progress  in import  liberalization
56.  After  having  remained  unchanged  since  the  inception  of the  Common
Market,  Central  American  countries  took  an initial  step  in  rationalizing
their  trade  policies  and  in  beginning  to reduce  the  anti-export  bias  in
their  trade  strategy  by introducing  a new  regime  on January  1, 1986. These
reforms  were supported  by a US$80.0  million  SAL  I Loan  by the  World  Bank  to
Costa  Rica. Costa  Rica  took  further  and  stronger  steps  in import
liberalization  during  the  Second  Tranche  disbursement  of SAL  I  by
eliminating  import  surcharges  on final  consumer  goods. Costa  Rica  plans  to
continue  to reforis  its  trade  regime  and  reduce  the  level  and  dispersion  in
effective  protection  in the  next  several  years. The  World  Bank  is- 16 -
supporting  these  positive  efforts  of the  Costa  Rican  authorities  through  a
US$100  million  SAL  II operation.  Although  the  reforms,  both  implemented
and  planned,  are  in  the  right  direction,  there  is  a long  way to  go in
achieving  a fully  satisfactory  liberalized  trade  regime  in the  Region.
This  report  suggests  targets  to be  achieved  to  eliminate  the  anti-exporL
bias  in the  trade  regime  of  the  Region  within  a Common  Market. The
suggested  policies  could  well  be introduced  by one  or several  countries  or
they  could  be adopted  by all  the  Common  Market  members. Although  it is
desirable  that  these  policies  be adopted  by  all  the  members,  if the
negotiations  for  reaching  a common  understanding  fail  to  materialize,  then
each  member  would  obviously  weigh  the  costs  and  benefits  of staying  in  the
Common  Market  versus  taking  a  unilateral  action. This  report  does  not  deal
with the  strategy  of introducing  reforms  in the  Region,  but it  favors  a
joint  action.
57.  Because  of the  importance  of the  tariff  reform  supported  under  the
SAL  I operation  for  Costa  Rica,  the  following  describes  the  progress
achieved  in the  liberalization  of  trade:
(i)  eliminated  all  specific  rates  in  nominal  tariffs  and
converting  them  to  ad-valorem  rates;
(ii) converted  the  classification  system  for  goods  from  the
Central  America  classification  system  (NAUCA)  to the
Brussels  nomenclature;
(ii) terminated  all  tariff  exemptions  under  the  Central  American
Agreement  on Fiscal  incentives;
(iv) abrogated  the  regional  investment  incentives  and  the  San
Jose  Protocol  (a  30Z  surcharge  on the  common  external
tariff;  and
(v)  created  a Central  American  Council  for  tariffs  and  customs
with  authority  to establish  and  modify  import  tariffs
without  the  need  for  legislative  action  by  member  countries.
58.  In terms  of the  modification  of rates,  the  Regional  Treaty  aimed
at the  following  targets;
(a)  goods  produced  outside  the  CACM (non-competing  imports):
(i) essential  final  consumer  goods,  raw  materials,
intermediate  and  capital  goods: a  minimum  5 percent
rate,  and  exemptions  for  goods  which  are  considered  to
be strategic  for  development  on an exceptional  basis;
and
(ii)  non-essential  final  consumer  goods  and inputs  used  in
the  production  of these  goods: a 10  percent  rate.
(b) goods  produced  within  the  CACM (competing  imports):
(i)  raw  materials,  intermediate  and  capital  goods: a 10,  20
or 30 percent  rate,  depending  on the  level  of
processing;  and
(ii)  final  consumer  goods: a rate  ranging  from  35 to 70
percent,  with few  exceptions  for  fiscal  and  balance  of
payments  purposes  up to and  including  90  percent.- 17  -
59.  Since  the  effect  of the  planned  regional  tariff  regime  in lowering
effective  protection  was small,  the  Costa  Rican  Government  agreed  to  go
beyond  the  regional  agreement  to further  reduce  effective  protection  by
undertaking  the  following  modifications  to  the  regionally  agreed  rates:
(a)  intermediate  and  raw  material  goods  produced  outside  the
CACM (non-competing  goods): a  minimum  10  percent;  and
(b)  capital  goods: a  minimum  20  percent.
To achieve  these  rates,  the  Costa  Rican  Government  agreed  to add
the  indicated  rates  through  import  _urcharges:
(a)  raw  materials  and intermediate  goods  (non-competing  goods):
a 5  percent  rate;  and
(b)  capital  goods: between  a 10-15  percent  rate.
60.  Implementation  of tariff  reform. Based  on regional  negotiations,
the  following  rate  structure  emerged:
TABLE  III:  COMPARISON  OF OLD  TARIFF  REGIME,  NEW  TARIFF  REGIME
AND PLANNED  REGIME
(z)
Old  New  1/  Planned
Regime  Regime  Regime
Max. Avg.  Max.  AvR.  Avg.
Final  Consumer  Goods
Regionally  Produced  530.2  92.5  143.0 65.I  32.6
Non-Regionally  Produced
Essential  130.3  40.6  65.5 15.2  5.4
Non-Essential  314.2  135.0  253.0 18.4  34.0
Intermediate  Goods  and  Raw  Materials
Regionally  Produced  1393.4 54.3  203.0 34.1  20.9
Non-Regionally  Produced  332.8 32.6  108.0 11.2  5.0
Capital  Goods
Regionally  Produced  248.5  73.9  153.0  35.6  24.7
Non-Regionally  Produced  73.0 23.7  28.0  15.1  5.5
1I  The  two rows  indicate  the  planned  rates  as of January  1, 1986.  Some  of
the  parametes  might  likely  have  changed  since  then,  as  Costa  Rica  modified
some  surcharge  rates.
Source: SIECA,  Central  Bank  of Costa  Rica,  Bank  Staff  Estimates.- 18  -
61.  The  initial  reform  reduced  effective  protection  and  its  dispersion
in  a  modest  way.  The  decrease  ill  effective  protection  resulted  mainly  from
the  introdiction  of import  duties  on raw  materials,  intermediate  products
and  capital  goods. The  impact  of the  reduction  in  high  legal  tariff  rates
on lowering  effective  protection  was limited. Increases  in tariffs  for
competing  raw  materials,  intermediate  and  capital  goods  raised  effective
protection  for  these  goods.
62.  The  structure  of protection  remained  similar  to the  previous
regime. Rates  for  final  consumer  goods  are  still  high  and  rates  for
intermediate  and  capital  goods  are  low  ar.d  are  exempted  under  national
incentive  schemes  as compared  to  the  regional  one  prior  to the  reform.
63.  Member  countries  could  not  agree  on common  rates  for  some  of the
rates  (Part  II  of the  new  tariff  schedule). This  category  of  products
includes  .ostly  textiles,  clothing  and  paper. Rates  for  some  of these
products  were  actually  raised  under  the  new  system,  leading  to increased
effective  protection.  These  products  were  heavily  protected  under  the
previous  tariff  regime  and  are  important  in  relation  to domestic
production. It is  essential  that  rates  for  these  products  be unified
within  the  overall  target  rates  in  the  next  stages  of the  tariff  reform.
64.  Member  countries  agreed  to set  rates  for  some  products  (Part  III
of the  new tariff  schedule)  on a  national  basis. This  agreement  broke  the
common  external  tariff  concept  for  this  category  of goods. The  main item
in this  group  is  petroleum.
65.  The  Costa  Rican  Government  phased  out  surcharges  on final  consumer
goods  during  SAL  I - Second  Tranche  negotiations,  reducing  effective
protection.  But,  the  Government  also  decreased  surcharges  on intermediate
inputs  and  capital  goods,  increasing  effective  protection  after  the  Second
Tranche  of the  SAL  I  was  disbursed.
66.  The  net  impact  of the  tariff  reform  in  1986  on reducing  effective
protection  should  be explored  in  more  detail. The  preliminary  evidence
shows  that  the  reform  reduced  only  the  water  in  the  tariff,  while  effective
protection  was increased  for  some  products,  which  were  heavily  protected
before  the  reform.
67.  To improve  resource  allocation  as  well as to  harmonize  taxes  on
imports,  it is  essential  that  tariffs  not  be used  as  an instrument  to
protect  the  bala.nce  of payments  and  hence  tariff-like  surcharges  should  not
be imposed  on top  of regional  tariffs.
Targets  for  tariff  reform
68.  There  is  a need  for  specifying  targets  to  be achieved  for  the  next
few  years  to reduce  effective  protection.  Owing  to  difficulties  in
decreasing  tariffs  in  one  step,  a staged  approach  is suggested.  The  next
stage  of the  reform  would  need to  aim  at reducing  the  highest  tariff  rate
to 40Z,  while  increasing  the  lowest  tariff  rate  to 20Z. The  increase  in
the lowest  rate  would  not only  help  reduce  effective  protection,  it  would
also  generate  government  revenues. However,  the  lowest  tariff  should  not
be allowed  to increase  much further  than  the  suggested  20?  rate  since- 19  -
raising  low  tariffs  on intermediate  products  and  capital  goods
discriminates  against  exports  by raising  the  anti-export  bias  of the
incentive  system  and  results  in an  appreciation  of the  exchange  rate.
69.  If  the increase  of the  lowest  rate  to  20Z  is  not  politically
feasible,  then  a reduction  of the  highest  rate  is  vital  for  decreasing
effective  protection  in a  meaningful  way.  Without  raising  the lowest
tariff  rate,  a reduction  in  tariff  rates  on final  consumer  goods  would  not
lead  to a significant  decrease  in overall  effective  protection  rates.
Obviously,  the  above-mentioned  targets  could  be  modified  to take  into
account  the  political  difficulties  in raising  the  floor  rate. This  could
be achieved  by scaling  down  the  highest  rate  to  302. Likewise,  maintaining
the  present  52 floor  rate  would  be  consistent  with a  highest  tariff  rate  of
252. Clearly,  it  is  desirable  to  establish  a higher  minimum  rate  to  ensure
that  changes  in tariff  rates  would  not lead  to reduced  government  revenues.
In case  politically  viable  options  rule  out  raising  the  floor  tariff  rate
over  52 and  fiscal  revenues  decline,  then  authorities  in  the  Region  will
need  to raise  other  revenues  to compensate  for  the  fall  in revenues  from
imports. Raising  selective  consumption  taxes  or increasing  the  rate  of the
value  added  tax  would  be options  to  consider.
70.  Agreement  on a  politically  viable  target  floor  tariff  rate
presents  a number  of  problems. First,  imported  inputs  used  in producing
non-traditional  exports  would  need  to be  exempted  from  payment  of  duties.
It is  vitally  important  to exempt  the  export  sector  from  payment  of duties
to ensure  that  it  purchases  inputs  at  world  market  prices. It is important
that  all the  countries  in  the  Region  tollow  these  principles  to  avoid
creation  of any  disadvantage  to  any  particular  country,  providing
exemptions.
71.  Second,  the  minimum  rate  on capital  goods  should  be  high  enough  to
encourage  employment  of labor  in  view  of  the  underpricing  of  capital  and
the  need to  encourage  firms  to  use  domestic  inputs  by  making  these  inputs
cheaper  compared  to  domestically  available  inputs,  but  low  enough  to ensure
reactivation  of the  economies  through  high  levels  of investment.  Third,
since  the  Region  does  not  possess  an apparent  comparative  advantage  in the
production  of  most  capital  goods  and  intermediate  goods,  it is important
not to  provide  excessive  protection  to these  goods. This  is  especially
important  if these  products  are  used  as inputs  to  non-traditional  exports
to  markets  outside  the  CACM. Those  products  would  need  to be  produced  at  a
high  quality  if they  are  to  be produced  domestically  and  used in  exports  as
inputs. In any  case,  countries  should  provide  exemptions  on regionally
produced  inputs  if  they  are  utilized  in  manufacturing  exports  outside  the
CACM.  Fourth,  given  the  large  share  of these  products  in total  imports  as
well as in  GDP, they  provide  a good  taxable  base.  Exempting  them  from
import  taxes  would  unnecessarily  lead  to  large  reductions  in  potential
tariff  revenues.
72.  Fifth,  it  may also  prove  to  be difficult  to reduce  higher  rates,
hence  an increase  in  the  floor  rate  is  needed  to reduce  effective
protection. Sixth,  since  at  the  final  phase  of the  tariff  reform,  rates
should  be  unified,  unification  at the  minimum  rate  of 52  does  not  seem  to
be realistic.  Therefore,  the  minimum  rate  will  need  to be raised  in later
stages  of  the  tariff  reform  if  unification  is  to be achieved. Hence,  this
paragraph  underscores  the  need  for  establishing  a floor  tariff  rate  of  at
least  102 (which  indicates  that  the  highest  rate  should  be no  more than- 20 -
302).  Seventh,  no other  non-distortionary  revenue  source  could  match  the
magnitude  of revenues  which  could  be collected  from  this  source. Eighth,
taxing  imports  of intermediate  and  capital  goods  used  in the  manufacture  of
goods  sold  in the  regional  market  will increase  the  relative  profitability
of non-traditional  exports  outside  the  CACM,  which  will be  exempted  from
such  duties  under  various  drawback  schemes  discussed  in  this  report.
Lastly,  sustainability  of a trade  reform  hinges  on  maintaining  financial
stability. To the  extent  additional  revenues,  which  could  be  collected
through  raising  the  import  tariff  floor  rate,  compensate  for  the  fall  in
revenues  caused  by the  tariff  reduction  and  help  maintain  macro-financial
stability,  they  would  contribute  to the  sustainability  of the  tariff
reform.
73.  Regarding  the  highest  tariff  rate,  it is important  to  note  that
some  exceptions  to the  rule  could  be accepted  on infant  industry  protection
grounds. But  the  principle  of  harmonization  indicates  that  the  rate  should
be set  on a regional  basis,  be applied  to few  commodity  groups  for  a
definite  time  period. If  these  exceptions  are  provided  to  non-competitive
products  and for  long  periods  of time,  the  benefits  from  trade
liberalization  will  not likely  be obtained. In this  context,  it is
important  to  note  that  most  countries  in the  Region  still  prefer  to  provide
high  protection  to inefficient  industries  such  as textiles  and  footware  for
at least  the  next  few  years. This report  suggests  that  this  policy  be
reversed  and  trade  liberalization  for  this  group  of products  be
accelerated.
74.  Another  issue  regards  the  preference  of the  countries  to tax
luxury  imports  through  high  tariffs  or surcharges  on imports. These  rates
could  encourage  the  development  of  domestic  industries  producing  such
goods. This  report  suggests  that  these  imports  be taxed  through  domestic
transaction  taxes,  which  would  be levied  on both  d3mestic  and imported
goods  at the  same  rates.
75.  Intermediate  goods. Considering  that  tax  rates  or.  intermediate
products  would  be increased,  those  goods  may require  some  do-gree  of
protection  after  the  introduction  of further  stages  of the  tariff  reform.
However,  additional  protection  to  be granted  to  intermediate  goods  has to
be reviewed  carefully  on  a product-by-product  basis  to ensure  that
inefficient  production  of these  goods  not  be given  undue  encouragement.
76.  Complementary  exchange  rate  policies. Implementation  of an active
exchange  rate  policy  during  a period  of reduction  of high  tariffs  on
consumer  goods  would  be  needed  to ensure  that  the  trade  balance  in  the
balance  of  payments  not deteriorate  unnecessarily.  To achieve  a real
depreciation,  however,  the  authorities  in the  Region  should  drastically
reduce  or eliminate  public  sector  deficits. Otherwise,  real  devaluation
coupled  with  domestic  financing  of  high  public  sect:or  deficits--given  that
external  financing  is limited--would  likely  lead  to inflationary  pressures
and  would  not  permit  an improvement  in  the  trade  account  of the  balance  of
payments.- 21 -
Sustainability  of tariff  liberalization  efforts
77.  The  World  Bank  has released  interim  conclusions  os a study  on
lessons  to be  derived  from  trade  liberalization  episodes  based  on a study
of various  countries.  According  to this  study,  some  resource-poor  and
small  countries  have  undergone  successful  trade  liberalization  efforts.
Since  Central  American  countries  fit  well into  this  category  of countries,
it  can  be inferred  that  being  small  and  resource-poor  should  not  preclude
any  of the  countries  in  the  Region  from  undertaking  a successful  trade
liberalization  program. The  main  conclusions  for  the  successful
liberalization  episodes  include  the  following:
(i)  maintaining a  depreciated  exchange  rate  in real  terms;
(ii)  having  a low  budget  deficit;
(iii) achieving  favorable  export  performance;
(iv)  being  implemented  under  extreme  duress;
(v)  introducing  strong  reforms  ("strong  liberalization  attempts
tend  to  be sustained. These  are  mostly  episodes  which
start  with significant,  rather  than  minor  and  marginal
steps  of liberalization");  and
(vi)  maintaining  political  stability.
78.  This  report  does  not  analyze  to  what  extent  the  conditions  in
countries  in  Central  America  fit  into  the  criteria  deemed  to  be desirable
for  achieving  and  sustaining  a successful  trade  liberalization  effort.
However,  it is  important  to  note  that  further  changes  in  trade
liberalization  should  be strong  to  lead--presumably--to  robust  export
growth--through  eliminating  the  anti-export  bias  of the  trade  regime-
-needed  for  the  survival  of the  reform  efforts.
Revenue  implications  of a tariff  reform
79.  This  report  suggests  that  the  next  steps  in the  tariff  reform
would  need to  take  account  of revenue  implications  of the  reforms.
Assuming  that  both  the  exchange  rate  and  import  volumes  remain  unchanged
following  trade  liberalization,  reductions  in  tariffs  on final  consumer
goods  would  lead  to  a loss  in fiscal  revenues  by the  amount  of the  decrease
in  tariffs. If the  reform  also  includes  an increase  in  the  floor  rate,
revenues  would  likely  increase. Given  the  share  of intermediate  and
capital  goods  in total  imports  and  depending  on the  amount  of the  increase
in  the  floor  rate,  overall  tariff  revenues  would  likely  expand. However,
if  import  volumes  respond  to changes  in tariff  rates,  fiscal  revenues  could
increase  slowly,  given  that  price  sensitive  category  of capital  goods  and
some  intermediate  goods  would  likely  decline  if tariff  rates  are increased.
Expansion  in final  consumer  goods  imports,  however,  could  offset  the  rate
decline  proposed  for  final  consumer  goods. If a real  devaluation
accompanies  the  tariff  reform,  then  tariff  revenues  could  increase,  despite
lower  volumes  and  lower  rates  on final  consumer  goods.- 22 -
80.  Assuming  that  the  tariff  reform  does  i,et include  an increase  in
the  floor  rate,  then  the  impact  of the  tariff  reform  on fiscal  revenues
will likely  be negative. In the  absence  of  a real  devaluation,  a decline
in  high  rates  wouid  lead  to  a decrease  in tariff  revenues,  while  a  volume
increase  would  expand  it.  A real  devaluation  would  lead  to  an expansion  in
fiscal  revenues  in  domestic  currencies,  but  the  final  impact  depends  on
changes  in import  volumes  and  in tariff  rates.
1.1.2. Export  taxes
81.  In general,  the  structure  of production  and  exports  is a  major
determinant  of the  tax  structure.  This  is especially  important,  regarding
the  choice  of  corporate  income  taxes  and  export  taxes. Empirical
investigations  of tax  structures  of developing  countries  indicate  that
countries  which  rely  heavily  on export  taxes  make  little  use  of corporate
income  taxes  and  vice  versa.
82.  Empirical  investigation  of developing  countries  also  indicate
that,  on average,  export  taxes  generate  11%  of tax  revenue  (1.7Z  of  GDP)
for  low  income  countries  and  less  than  32 (0.52  of GDP)  for  middle  income
developing  countries. The ratio  of export  taxes  to exports  is  11Z  for  the
low  income  groups  and  about  42 in  middle  income  developing  countries.
83.  Export  taxes  account  for  a large  share  of fiscal  revenues  in
Central  America. Because  of the  relative  ease  of administration,  countries
in  the  Region  rely  on these  taxes  as a substitute  for  income  tax. The
share  of these  taxes  in total  Central  Government  revenues  also  correlate
positively  with  the  share  of exports  in  GDP.  Since  export  growth  is  a
critically  important  objective--badly  needed  to put  the  Region  on a
sustainable  growth  path--care  needs  to be  exercised  in  not  overtaxing
exports  to the  point  at  which  export  growth  is  discouraged.
84.  Taxation  of  exports  shows  differences  according  to commodity
groups. It is  mostly  concentrated  on traditional  commodities,  and
specifically  on coffee  and  bananas. Those  two  commodities  provide  the  bulk
of revenues  from  exports. Exports  to  CACM  are  exempted  from  taxation  as
noted  earlier  in  this  report. Similarly,  non-traditional  exports  outside
the  CACH  are  either  not  taxed  or taxed  at low  rates.
Conclusions
85.  It is  desirable  to implement  common  principles  regarding  export
taxation. However,  there  is  no point  in  harmonizing  these  taxes  among  the
member  countries. Taxes  on coffee  exports  are  discussed  in the  following
section. In  the  short-term,  taxes  on  banana  exports  should  be  maintained
as a substitute  for  income  taxes. However,  care  needs  to be  exercised  to
ensure  that  tax  rates  are  maintained  at  the  same  or similar  levels  and  at
ad-valorem  rates,  and  that  their  levels  are  set  in such  a  way  that  they  are
not  permitted  to discourage  exports. Since  marketing  for  banana  exports  is
in the  hands  of the  large  multinational  corporations  in  the  Region,  some
form  of taxation  as  a proxy  for  income  tax  would  be useful. However,
taxation  of these  companies  has  to take  note  of the  circumstances  of the
international  banana  market  and  the  possibility  of banana  companies  leaving
Central  America  to  other  countries  which  do not  have  a similar  tax  burden.- 23 -
Regarding  taxation  of  non-traditional  exports,  it  is strongly  recommended
to  eliminate  any  tax  which  might  exist  in  any  country  in  the  Region,  given
the  urgent  need  to encourage  the  growth  of these  exports. In fact,  taxing
non-traditional  exports  coupled  with granting  of incentives  for  the  same
category  of goods  doed  not  make sense.
1.1.2.1. Taxes  on coffee  exports
86.  Coffee  has  a significant  impact  on the  economies  in  Central
America. The  five  countries  of the  CACM  are,  as a group,  one  of the
largest  coffee  producers  in  the  world. Since  these  economies  are
relatively  small,  the  coffee  sector  plays  a key  role  in  each  of  those
countries. All  the  countries  in the  Region  produce  and  export  coffee. The
Coffee  sector  accounts  for  a significant  share  of fiscal  revenues  and
export  earnings  ir.  all  the  countries  in the  Region. The  degree  of
dependence  of each  country  on foreign  exchange  earnings  from  coffee,
however,  is  different.
87.  There  are  various  reasons  for  the  importance  of export  taxes  on
coffee. First,  coffee  exports,  as  mentioned  earlier,  account  for  an
important  share  of  GDP in  all  the  countries  in  the  Region. Second,  the
sector  hardly  pays  any  income  tax,  and  hence  export  taxes  can  be  considered
as a substitute  for  income  taxes. Third,  low  collection  costs  and  easy
administration  of the  tax  makes  it  an attractive  instrument.  Fourth,  the
stupply  elasticity  of  exports  is relatively  low, with limited  possibilities
of diversification  into  other  crops,  at least  in  the  short-term,  while  slow
growth  in international  demand  limits  exports. As a result,  taxation  of
coffee  exports  can  be  considered  a second-best  alternative  to taxing
incomes  from  export  earnings.
88.  Coffee  exports  need  to  be taxed  as long  as the  International
Coffee  Agreement  (ICA)  operates. Each  country  in the  Region  has  a
different  set  of taxes  on coffee  exports. These  differences  stem  from:
(i)  different  levels  of production  costs  in  each  country,
resulting  in  varying  levels  of a tax-free  threshold  price;
and
(ii)  the  particular  method  by  which  windfall  profits  are  shared
between  producers,  exporters,  and  the  public  sector.
Conclusions
89.  The  design  of  a tax  on  coffee  exports  needs  to  take  into  account
the  large  swings  in the  international  price  of coffee. Given  the
importance  of the  commodity  in the  Region,  a good  macro  management  of  booms
as  well as reduced  prices  is  crucial  to  avoid  inflationary  pressures  in  the
case  of increases  in  coffee  prices  as  well  as recessions  during  drops  in
coffee  prices. Taxation  of  coffee  exports  appears  to be the  most  effective
tool  to achieve  the  above-noted  objectives.  The  Central  American  countries
should  be in  a position  to capitalize  on and  improve  growth  and  debt-
servicing  prospects  during  windfalls. Poor  management  of  booms  has
generally  led  to over-consumption,  with the  public  sectors  starting  or- 24  -
expanding  inefficient  investments  as  well  as increasing  current
expenditures.  The  experience  of the  counties  during  1976-77  as  well  as in
1986  are  good  examples  of  bad  management  of coffee  booms. For  example,
Costa  Rica  undertook  an ambitious  public  investment  program  and  expanded
current  expenditures  while  borrowing  on a large  scale. Conversely,  high
taxes  on  coffee  exports  could  accelerate  the  initial  recessionary  impact  of
a drop  in  coffee  prices.
90.  An expansion  in  domestic  demand  following  a  boom  in  prices  could
lead  to  a sharp  increase  in  imports  and  hence  a deterioration  in the
balance  of payments  of these  countries.  However,  if restrictive  fiscal  and
monetary  policies  are  introduced,  international  reserves  could  be
strengthened,  permitting  a  higher  rate  of  domestic  investment  over  the
coffee  cycle  while  coffee  prices  return  to  normal  levels.
91.  If international  coffee  prices  increase,  authorities  are  faced
with  various  options. These  include: (i)  strengthening  international
reserves;  (ii)  reducing  foreign  liabilities;  (iii)  raising  domestic  capital
investment  (i.e.  public  investment);  and (iv)  increasing  current  public
sector  expenditures.  This  report  suggests  that  part  of the  windfall
revenues  should  be saved  to increase  international  reserves. To the  extent
that  capital  expenditure  programming  is  possible,  increased  capital
expenditures  is  also  recommended  to  utilize  the  windfall  to enhance
development.  Given  that  price  increases  are  generally  temporary,  however,
care  needs  to  be taken  in  planning  these  expenditures,  including  planning
and  budgeting  for  the  current  expenditure  requirements  for  those
investments.
92.  The  use  of fiscal  policies  is  more  apprapriate  than  monetary
policies  in  dealing  with  problems  created  by coffee  booms. Following  an
increase  in coffee  prices,  liquidity  in  the  financial  system  expands. To
absorb  the  excess  liquidity,  authorities  could  either  use  monetary  policy
by increasing  reserve  requirements,  reducing  credit  or they  could  use
fiscal  policies  by introducing  higher  tax  rates. In the  latter  case,  the
public  sector  would  absorb  part  of the  windfall.
93.  Tight  monetary  policies  would  likely  lead  to large  swings  in  the
availability  of credit,  whereas  restrictive  fiscal  policies  could  be used
to stabilize  economic  activity  through  taxing  part  of the  increased
revenues. When  prices  rise,  a part  of the  increase  in international
reserves  would  be transferred  into  a coffee  stabilization  fund.
Conservely,  when  prices  drop  below  a pre-determined  level,  funds
accumulated  in  the  coffee  stabilization  fund  would  be utilized. Hence,  the
functioning  of the  fund  could  help stabilize  economic  activity,  limit
excessive  increases  in  consumption,  and  permit  a better  use  of financial
availabilities  through  helping  to finance  a  carefully  screened  and
evaluated  investment  projects.
94.  Any tax  on coffee  exports  should  take  into  account  the  need  to
protect  production  and  employment  in  the  sector. Hence,  it  is recommended
to exempt  coffee  exports  from  the  tax  when inteinational  prices  fall  below
a pre-determined  level. This  level  could  be set  above  the  highest  cost  of
production  in  each  country. The  coffee  sector  is  generally  labor-intensive
and  wage costs  and  availability  of labor  varies  in each  country  in  Central
America. As a result,  unit  production  costs  need  to  be taken  into  account- 25 -
in  establishing  an  export  price  below  which  exports  will  be exempted  from
taxes. In  the  case  of Honduras,  for  example,  average  production  cost  per
quintal  (i.e.  46  kg.)  was estimated  by the  Honduran  authorities  to be  equal
to 165.0  lempira  (US$82.5  at the  official  exchange  rate)  in  1988.  Hence,
the  World  Bank  Mission,  which  visited  Honduras  during  January  1988,
recommended  a floor  price  for  exemptions  on taxes  on coffee  exports
equalling  180.0  lempira  per  quintal,  to allow  for  a possible  increase  in
the  cost  of production  in  the  next few  years.
95.  Regarding  the  structure  of rates,  it is  recommended  that  beyond  a
pre-determined  export  price  (i.e.  a high  value,  perhaps  US$  2.0  a  pound),  a
50  tax  rate  be established  on the  price  exceeding  that  limit. This
structure  would  permit  the  public  sector  to share  windfall  gains  with
producers/exporters  in  equal  proportions. It is  to  be noted  that  the
floor-ceiling  prices  for  the  price  stabilization  fund  do not  necessarily
have  to coincide  with  minimum  and  maximum  tax  rates.
96.  There  is  no obvious  reason  to  harmonize  taxes  on coffee  exports  in
the  Region. Given  the  differences  in  unit  cost  of production,  and  the
reliance  of the  tax  system  on these  taxes  (i.e.  much  more significant  in  El
Salvador  compared  to  Costa  Rica)  and  lack  of interdependence  among  member
countries  on coffee  exports,  a specific  rate  structure  in  each  country  does
not  necessarily  have  to  be the  same. However,  the  main  principles
described  in  this  section  of the  report  could  be applied  to all  the
countries  in  the  Region.
97.  Another  issue  concerns  the  multiplicity  of taxes  on coffee. For
example,  in  Costa  Rica,  coffee  is taxed  both  at the  producer  level  as  well
as at the  exporter  level  through  two  taxes,  whereas  in  Honduras,  there  is
only  one  tax  on exportb. The  proliferation  of taxes  on coffee  exports  is
not  a good  policy. This report  suggests  that  coffee  exports  be taxed
through  one  tax.  The structure  of the  tax  could  allow  intermediate  rates
in  between  the  maximum  and  the  minimum  rates. The  taxable  base  in  each
price  range  would  be  determined  by the  excess  of each  price  over  the
preceding  rate. This  report  suggests  that  the  number  of such  rates  be held
to a  minimum: perhaps  two rates.
1.2. Domestic  Transaction  Taxes
98.  Empirical  investigations  indicate  that  domestic  transaction  taxes
on goods  and  services  account  for  about  4.5%  of GDP  and  over  one-fourth  of
total  tax  revenues  in  developing  countries. In fact,  some  countries
collect  more  than  10%  of GDP  and  collect  40Z  of total  tax  revenue  from
domestic  transaction  taxes  (i.e.  Chile).
1.2.1. Sales  Tax
99.  All  countries  in  the  region  have  some  form  of  a sales  tax,  either
in  a cascading  or a  value  added  form. In  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  and
Honduras,  the  sales  tax  takes  the  form  of  a value  added  type,  while  in  El
Salvador,  it  is a  cascading  stamp  tax. Rates  in  each  country  are  also
different,  with a range  of 1O0  in  Costa  Rica  and  5% in  Honduras.
Collections  from  sales  taxes  have  generally  been  significant,  accounting
for  about  one-third  of total  tax  collections  in  some  of the  countries.- 26  -
100.  It is important  to  avoid  cascading. First,  cascading  encourages
undue  vertical  integration  along  the  chain  of production  and  distribution.
Second,  as the  structure  of  an economy  becomes  more  complex,  the  chains  of
production  and  distribution  tend  to get  longer,  amplifying  the  adverse
effect  of a cascading  tax.
101.  This  report  suggests  that  a  value  added  tax  be the  backbone  of the
tax  system  in  the  Region. Value  added  tax  rates  need  not  be harmonized  for
the  countries  in the  Region. In fact,  VAT rates  will remain  different  in
the  EEC  even  after  1992. In the  case  of  El Salvador,  a conversion  of  the
cascading  sales  tax  at 5% to a  value  added  tax  at  a 10%  rate  is  estimated
by the  Salvadoran  authorities  to lead  to  a loss  in fiscal  revenues. The
Saivadoran  authorities  estimated  that  the  value  added  tax  rate  has to  be
set  at 14%  to obtain  the  same  level  of revenues  collected  from  a  cascading
sales  tax  at a 5Z rate. Given  the  present  and  projected  fiscal
difficulties  in  El S.alvador,  further  loss  of revenues  are  clearly  not
desirabie. Therefore,  El Salvador  may  have  a  higher  VAT  rate,  while  other
countries  in  the  Region  (i.e.  Honduras,  Guatemala)  may  have  slightly  lower
rates.
Conclusions
102.  The  value  added  tax  should  be a  uniform  rate  and  applied  on  as
broad  a  base  as  possible,  since  multiple  rates  create  considerable
administrative  complications.  Furthermore,  to the  extent  possible,  the  tax
should  include  services,  and  specifically  those  sold  by the  public  sector.
103.  A change  to  a value  added  tax  is  needed  in  El Salvador  to
rationalize  the  tax  system  by substituting  it  for  the  cascading  sales  tax.
Given  that  a  value  added  tax  has  a built-in  enforcement  aspect,  its
introduction  would  help  facilitate  cross-checking  among  firms  to  help
reduce  evasion.
104.  As presently  applied,  sales  revenues  collected  from  imports  exceed
50%  of total  collections  from  this  tax  in  most countries  in the  Region,
while  a low  share  of domestic  value  added  is  subject  to this  form  of
taxation. Hence,  broadening  the  base  of the  tax  requires  incorporating
small  retailers--that  do  not  keep  adequate  accounts--in  a  value  added  tax.
105.  Regarding  the  desired  attributes  of the  tax,  the  following  changes
are  suggested:
(i)  applying  the  tax  with a single  rate  rather  than  with
multiple  rates;
(ii)  incorporating  small  retailers  into  the  tax  while  exempting
very  small  firms  (i.e.  those  with revenues  not  exceeding  a
certain  level)  from  the  payment  of the  tax  in  order  to  make
it  administratively  manageable;
(iii) eliminating  exemptions  to simplify  administration  with the
exception  of basic  necessities  such  as food,  medicine  and
school  books  to lessen  the  regressivity  of the  tax;- 27 -
(iv)  levying  the  tax  both  on domestic  transactions  as  well  as on
imports  at the  same  rate  while  eliminating  the  cascading
feature  as practiced  in  El Salvador;
(v)  increasing  the  base  of the  tax  by incorporating  services,
including  those  provided  by public  sector  enterprises;  and
(vi)  exempting  all  exports  and  imported  inputs  and  capital  goods
used  in  manufacturing  non-traditional  exports  to  markets
outside  the  CACM.
1.2.2.  Selective  Consumption  Taxes
106.  This report  suggests  the  establishment  of a broad-based  selective
consumption  tax in  the  Region  to complement  the  value  added  tax. Costa
Rica  already  has  a  well-developed  selective  consumption  tax,  although  with
some  undesirable  features  such  as  excessively  high  rates  for  some  products.
This  report  suggests  that  other  member  countries  should  also  adopt  a
similar  tax  along  the  lines  of the  Costa  Rican  tax,  but  without  its
undesirable  features. This  type  of tax  would  be useful  in:  (i)  improving
resource  allocation  by discouraging  production  and  consumption  of luxury
items;  (ii)  strengthening  the  equity  of the  system  by providing
progressivity;  (iii)  offsetting  loss  of revenues  owing  to the
implementation  of further  tariff  reform;  and  (iv)  contributing  to the
reduction  in financial  disequilibrium  to the  extent  higher  collection  is
made possible  and  not spent  on  new  public  programs.
Conclusions
107.  The following  are  the  recommended  attributes  of the  proposed  tax:
(i)  keeping  the  number  of rates  to  at  most three  or four  to
simplify  the  administration  of the  tax  and  avoiding
excessive  rates  to reduce  incentives  for  evasion;
(ii)  levying  the  tax  at the  manufacture  level  for  domestically
produced  goods  to  avoid  cascading;
(iii) taxing  these  imports  at the  same  rates  as domestically
produced  goods  and  imports  and  applying  the  same  rates  for
imports  from  CACM  as  well  as imports  from  countries  outside
the  CACM;  and
(iv)  covering  a limited  range  of  commodities  under  the  tax,
focusing  on goods  whose  income  elasticity  of demand  is
larger  than  unity.
108.  The successful  implementation  of the  tax  requires  several  other
factors. First,  a freely  determined  market-oriented  price  system  would
help the  system  function  better. Otherwise,  establishing  a selective
consumption  tax  with  excessive  price  controls  runs  the  risk  of distorting
relative  prices. In  other  words,  the  imposition  of this  tax should  follow
or coincide  with the  action  of implementing  a program  to  decontrol  prices.- 28 -
Second,  it is important  to  coordinate  the  introduction  of this  tax  with
further  stages  of import  liberalization  efforts  to avoid  losses  of fiscal
revenues  and  to  protect  the  balance  of payments. Taxing  commodities  at
similar  rates  for  both  domestically  produced  and imported  goods  will ensure
that  no undue  protection  is  provided  to domestic  production  of luxury
goods. Third,  taxing  imports  both  from  the  CACM  and  those  from  outside  the
CACM  is vital  for  harmonizing  the  tax  regime  in the  Region. Fourth,  as
indicated  above,  this  tax  will  also  ensure  stability  in  revenues. Fifth,
taxing  luxury  goods  will  provide  a degree  of  equity  and  progressivity  to
the  system. In  view  of the  difficulties  in  raising  income  taxes  in the
Region  and  given  the  need  to  encourage  private  investment  to regain  past
growth  rates,  it is  essential  to introduce  this  tax  in  all  the  countries  in
the  Region. Lastly,  selective  cor&sumption  taxes  should  rot  be used  to
discriminate  against  imports  from  other  CACM  member  countries.
1.2.3.  Excise Taxation
109.  On average,  excise  taxes  account  for  2%  of GDi  and  about  12%  of
total  tax  revenues  in  developing  countries.  Collections  from  three
products--alcohol,  tobacco,  and  petroleum--generate  the  largest  share  of
revenues  from  this  source.
110.  All the  countries  in  the  Region  have  a  number  of excise  taxes  on
some  standard  group  of products  such  as  cigarettes,  beer  and  alcohol. Some
of the  rates  of these  taxes  are specific. Rates  are low  in some  product
categories  and  excessively  high in  others.  Collection  from  this  group  is
substantial  in some  countries. In El Salvador,  for  example,  excise  tax
collection  amounted  to about  92  of total  tax  revenues  in  1986.
111.  Conclusions.  This  form  of taxation  aims  at generating  revenue  and
reducing  consumption  of certain  products. It is recommended  to  keep  the
rates  of excise  taxes  at  moderate  levels,  convert  all  rates  into  an ad-
valorem  base  and  eliminate  those  which  generate  insignificant  levels  of
revenue. Excessive  rates  could  lead  to  evasion  or smuggling,  given  the
openness  of the  countries  in the  Region. Harmonization  of excise  taxation
would  be desirable,  but  it is  not  vital.
112.  Cars.  Presently,  cars  are  taxed  at  high rates  by excise  taxes  or
by import  surcharges  mainly  for  balance  of payments  purposes. However,
generous  exemptions  are  also  granted  such  as for  cars  for  taxi  drivers  and
cooperatives  in  Costa  Rica,  leading  to  unjustified  increases  in imports  and
a waste  of resources. It  is recommended  to tax  importation  of  cars  by an
ad-valorem  domestic  excise  tax,  which  would  be applicable  both  on imports
and  domestically  produced  cars  at the  same  rates  to  protect  balance  of
payments  and  increase  revenues  as  well  as to provide  equity  to the  tax
system. Although,  it is  not realistic  to  expect  that  any  of the  countries
in  Central  America  would  produce  cars  in  the  foreseeable  future,  this
report  suggests  not  giving  any  protection  to domestic  production.- 29 -
1.2.4. Taxation  of Petroleum  Products
113.  In  most  of the  countries  in the  Region,  retail  prices  of petroleum
products  are  higher  then  their  international  equivalents.  Some  products,
however,  such  as  diesel  and  kerosene,  are  generally  subsidized  to reduce
the  cost  of public  transport  and  food  items.
114.  Institutional  differences  exist  in  petroleum  imports-refining  and
marketing  in  each  country  in  the  Region. For  example,  in  Costa  Rica,  the
state  refinery,  RECOPE,  imports  both  crude  and  refined  petroleum  products
and  markets  them  at  prices  established  by the  Government.  A part  of the
financial  surplus  generated  by RECOPE  is  transferred  each  year  to the
Central  Government  as  well  as to other  public  sector  entities  in  the  form
of transfers.  For  example,  during  1986-87,  RECOPE's  surplus  was  used  to
finance  the  construction  of  private  ihouses,  intermediated  through  a public
sector  bank. Therefore,  petroleum  pricing  is  used  as an instrument  to  tax
petroleum  products,  while  there  are  no explicit  taxes  on  petroleum
products. In fact,  petroleum  imports  and  domestic  sales  are  exempt  from
all  taxes. In  Honduras,  a foreign  refinery,  TEXACO,  refines  crude
petroleum  products,  while  an inter-ministerial  public  agency  is responsible
for  importing  refined  petroleum  products  for  domestic  consumption.  The
difference  between  the  refinery  gate  import  price  and  domestic  selling
price  is transferred  to the  Central  Government  as a petroleum  differential
tax. There  are  other  small  excise  taxes  in the  sale  of  petroleum  products.
Guatemala  is a  producer  of  petroleum.
115.  When international  petroleum  prices  were  about  US$26-28  during
1982-83,  fiscal  revenues  from  taxation--either  through  pricing  or
taxation--were  very  low. Following  the  decline  in  international  prices  in
1986,  large  fiscal  gains  were realized  from  petroleum  marketing  since
domestic  prices  were  not reduced. Compared  to international  prices,  high
domestic  petroleum  prices  penalized  domestic  production  and  acted  as  a
further  constraint  on the  profitability  of exporting  to  markets  outside  the
CACH.
Conclusions
116.  To encourage  export  growth,  and  to  protect  output  and  employment,
there  is a  t,eed  for  moving  domestic  petroleum  prices  to  their  international
equivalents.  This  means  lower  revenues  from  petroleum  for  Central
Governments.  For  countries  facing  fiscal  problems,  this  is  not  an easy
task. However,  a  medium-term  program  needs  to  be prepared  and
implementation  started  according  to  that  program  for  each  country  to
achieve  this  objective  concurrently  with  other  measures  as discussed  in
this  report. Additionally,  there  is  a  need for  phasing  out  cross-subsidies
among  different  petroleum  products. Again,  this  is  a politically  sensitive
issue,  since  phasing  out  subsidies  for  kerosene  and  diesel  will likely
increase  transport  and  food  costs,  and  aggravate  tie  poverty  problem,
prevalent  in  most  of these  countries.  Hence,  cross-subsidization  among
different  products  should  be eliminated  only  over  time.
117.  Domestic  petroleum  prices  have  to  be determined  within  the
framework  of an overall  energy  strategy  in the  Region. All the  Central
American  countries  have  hydro-potential  and  they  have tapped  this  source  in- 30 -
different  degrees  through  contructing  a series  of  hydro-dams.  With the
exception  of Guatemala,  the  Region  relies  exclusively  on imported
petroleum. Even  in the  case  of Guatemala,  imports  cover  a large  part  of
the  country's  domestic  needs. Hence,  countries  in the  Region  are  faced
with a challenging  task. They  need  to  minimize  their  reliance  on petroleum
and  maximize  the  use  of hydro-power  to the  extent  technically  feasible.
This  requires  that  pricing  of  petroleum  products  should  be used  to conserve
the  use  of this  imported  input,  while  encouraging  the  use  of domestically
available  hydro  energy. From  this  point  of view,  somewhat  higher  petroleum
prices  over  international  prices  can  be justified. There  is  also  a  need  to
establish  an  explicit  and  hence  a transparent  tax  on petroleum  products.
This  would  also  facilitate  the  collection  effort.
2.  Direct  (Income  )Taxes
118.  Income  taxes  are  used  mostly  for  revenue  purposes. Additionally,
they  can  also  be used  to  provide  equity  in the  distribution  of the  tax
burden  among  different  income  groups. Empirical  studies  indicate  that  the
share  of income  taxes  in  GDP  and  in  total  tax  revenues  averages  about  6Z
and  312  respectively.  Income  taxes  vary  from  less  than  12  of  GDP in  Nepal
to almost  25Z  in  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  or from  6Z to 822  of total  tax
revenues.
2.1. Personal  Income  Tax
119.  Although  industrial  countries  raise  well over  half  their  revenues
from  personal  income  taxes,  developing  countries  collect  revenues  from
personal  income  tax  of  about  1.9%  of GDP  and  11Z  of total  tax  revenues.
120.  Effective  taxation  of  personal  income  is  hindered  by the  low  level
of literacy  (i.e.  except  Costa  Rica),  poor  accounting  standards,  a large
share  of the  agriculture  sector  in  the  economy,  and  the  fact  that  a
significant  part  of economic  activity  takes  place  in small  establishments.
These  adverse  factors  are  exacerbated  by  other  factors. First,  there  are
generally  a large  number  of taxable  income  brackets,  which  makes
administration  difficult. Second,  a large  number  of  deductions  and
exemptions  are  granted. Third,  existence  of different  taxes  on different
types  of income  creates  incentives  for  tax  payers  to recharacterize  income
to avoid  taxation. Fourth,  coverage  is limited. Some  sectors,  such  as the
self-employed  sector  and farm  income,  easily  avoid  the  tax. As a result,  a
small  share  of the  population  pays  income  taxes,  with the  result  that
incomes  of  the  wage and  salary  earners  provide  the  largest  base  from  which
the  tax  is  collected. Fifth,  the  most  elastic  tax  bases  (i.e.  incomes  from
the  non-traditional  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM)  are  parts  of the
economy  that  the  authorities  in  the  Region  achieve  rapid  growth,  providing
them  incentives  through  various  schemes  as described  later  in the  report.
Conclusions
121.  The  exemption  level  under  the  personal  income  tax  should  be set  at
a level  high  enough  to limit  the  number  of taxpayers  consistent  with the
administrative  capacity  of each  country. The  poorer  the  tax  administration
of the  country,  the  higher  the  level  of exemption  should  be.  The  objective- 31 -
of the  initial  rate  of the  tax  should  be to generate  revenue,  while  high
rates  should  be used  for  eqiity  reasons.
122.  Options  to  modify  the  tax  are  limited,  given  the  depressed  private
investment  and  the  previous  record  of capital  flight  from  the  Region  and
the  need  to reactivate  economies  through  private  sector  participation.  It
is to be  noted  that  there  is  no point  in  harmonizing  income  tax  brackets
owing  to different  income  levels  in  each  country. The  following
suggestions  are  made  to reform  the  income  tax  to ease  its  administration
and  minimize  its  impact  on increasing  distortions  in the  economy.
(i)  establishing  a relatively  high  threshold  level  for
exempted  income. (This  is  needed  to  provide  equity  and
reduce  collection  costs  by focusing  on  high income
earners);
(ii)  decreasing  deductions  and  exemptions  to  keep  the  base  of
the  tax  as  wide  as possible;
(iii)  reducing  the  number  of income  tax  brackets  and  keeping  the
progressivity  of the  rate  moderate;
(iv)  reducing  the  maximum  marginal  rate  to 35Z-40Z  and
(v)  expanding  the  coverage  of the  tax  over  time  through
incorporating  the  self-employed  sector  and  farm  income,
the  latter  being  accomplished  by shifting  the  commodity  to
income  taxes.
2.2. Taxes  on  Company  Incomes
123.  The  main  objective  of taxes  on corporations  is to generate
revenue,  and  to some  extent  provide  equity  to the  tax  system. Since
economic  development  leads  generally  to  an increase  in collections  from
corporate  income  taxes,  it  is expected  that  the  reliance  of the  tax  systems
of Central  American  countries  on taxes  on company  incomes  will likely
increase  over  time. Empirical  studies  indicate  that  corporate  income  taxes
account  for  about  3?  of GDP  and  17.5t  of total  tax  revenues  in developing
countries.
124.  The  tax  generally  falls  on large-scale  manufacturing.  In fact,
few  large  enterprises  generate  a substantial  share  of the  tax. It is  easy
to administer  the  tax  on large  enterprises.  One  known  advantage  of  this
type  of tax  is  that  it responds  quickly  to fluctuations  in  economic
activity.
125.  Company  taxation  as practiced  in the  Region  faces  a number  of
issues. First,  high  marginal  tax  rates  discourage  the  formation  of new
companies. Second,  high statutory  tax  rates  adversely  affect  payment  of
dividends  and  hence  development  of new  ventures. Third,  existence  of a
large  number  of exemptions  and  deductions  under  the  corporate  income  tax
tends  to reduce  collection.  Fourth,  complex  rate  structures  make
administration  difficult. Fifth,  high  and  excessive  tax  rates  for  foreign
companies  discourage  direct  foreign  investment.  Sixth,  different  concepts- 32 -
of gross  income  and  deductions  ainong  the  countries  also  make it  difficult
to calculate  and  compare  after-tax  profits. Lastly,  the  tax  discourages
the  growth  of companies  by equity,  but  favors  growth  through  debt
financing.
Conc  lus  ions
126.  Taxation  of companies  should  be  used  to improve  resource
allocation  and  the  equity  of the  system. Similar  rules  have  to be provided
for  foreign  and  domestic  companies  to  make the  tax  neutral  in  investment
decisions.  A free  movement  of capital  among  these  countries  will be
encouraged  through  eliminating  discrimination  against  foreign  firms. A
consideration  has to  be given  to  harmonize  this  tax  in the  Region. Given
the  scarcity  of capital  and  the  need  to encourage  investment,  taxation
should  be designed  to  attract  foreign  capital.
127.  The  following  recommendations  are  made  with the  intention  of
improving  the  tax:
(1)  reducing  the  highest  marginal  tax  rate  to 35Z  - 40Z;
(ii)  eliminating  most  existing  allowances  under  the  tax;
(iii)  setting  only  a few  rates  to simplify  administration;
(iv)  taxing  foreign  and  domestic  corporations  at the  same  rate
in  order  not to  discriminate  against  foreign  companies  and
to  attract  foreign  capital;
(v)  harmonizing  fiscal  incentives  at the  regional  level  as
practiced  before  the  1986  tariff  reform;
(vi)  taxing  non-distributed  retained  earnings  at  a lower  rate
compared  to  dividends  to encourage  reinvestment  of
retained  earnings  for  expanding  existing  plants  and
establishing  new  ones;  and
(vii)  developing  and  implementing  a  coherent  set  of rules  to
define  income,  deductions  and  exemptions.
2.3.  Property  taxes
128.  Property  taxes  generally  do not  generate  substantial  amounts  of
revenue  in  developing  countries,  accounting  for  less  than  0.5Z  of  GDP.
However,  they  can  be  used  to provide  equity  to  the  tax  system  and
contribute  to  the  cost  of  managing  large  cities  if their  use  is assigned  to
local  governments.  Hence,  countries  with a  highly  uneven  income
distribution  and  with  a large  concentration  of  wealth  (i.e.  Guatemala)
should  make  a greater  effort  in  collecting  this  tax. Additionally,
countries  with a  higher  level  of urbanization  should  also  make greater  use
of these  taxes.- 33 -
129.  The  property  tax  as implemented  in  Central  America  suffers  from  a
number  of issues,  including  low  tax  rates,  generous  exemptions,  infrequent
adjustments  for  inflation,  lack  of  updated  assessments,  resulting  in low
levels  of statutory  rates. Factors  such  as  poor  administration,  incomplete
tax  rolls  and low  collection  efficiency  reduce  effective  tax  rates. As a
result,  collection  from  property  taxes  have  remained  low.
130.  Conclusions.  There  is  a  need for  increasing  property  tax
collections.  This  will  not  only  help  raise  revenues,  but  will  also  provide
equity  to the  tax  system. Property  tax  collections  could  also  encourage
private  savings. Taking  into  account  those  considerations,  it is
recommended  to set  high tax  rates  for  luxury  housing. To raise  collection,
it is  suggested  to create  cadasters  or update  them  if  they  exist. It is
important  to  note,  however,  that  the  implementation  of these  suggestions
and  hence  higher  revenues  from  this  source  will  take  time  to  materialize.
2.4.  Land  Taxes
131.  Despite  the  existence  of land  taxes  in  the  Region,  they  are  not
sufficiently  enforced  and  rates  are  low. As a result,  collection  from
these  taxes  have  remained  insignificant.
132.  Conclusions.  There  is  a  need for  using  the  scarce  land  resources
effectively,  especially  in  countries  where  land  is in  short  supply  compared
to population.  To ensure  effective  exploitation,  there  is  a need  for
introducing  a tax,  or--if  it  already  exists--increasing  rates  to  meaningful
levels,  on vacant  land. This  tax  could  help  in raising  the  cost  of  holding
land  vacant  for  its  owners  and  hence  it  could  encourage  efficient
utilization  of land. Owing  to  different  levels  of scarcity  of land  in  each
country  as  well as other  country-specific  factors,  rates  can  not  be
harmonized,  but  the  principle  of application  of the  tax  could  be applied  by
all  member  countries  in the  Region.
2.5.  Taxes  on Financial  Transactions
133.  Taxes  on  Capital  Gains. There  are  essentially  two  broad  types  of
taxes  on  capital  gains: one  on real  estate  and  the  other  on capital
appreciation  in  financial  securities.  In  Central  America,  collection  from
both  of these  taxes  has  been  insignificant.  In  view  of the  rudimentary
stage  of  development  of financial  markets  in these  countries  and  the  need
to promote  financial  savings,  introduction  of new  taxes  on  capital  gains  is
not  suggested  in the  short-term.  Furthermore,  even  if such  a tax  is
imposed,  capital  losses  should  be  made  tax-deductible--an  unrealistic
proposition,  given  the  low  level  of sophistication  in financial  matters  and
the  underdeveloped  nature  of the  financial  markets. Additionally,  such  a
tax  will likely  inhibit  development  of the  financial  and  capital  markets.
Harmonization  of policies  on this  tax  is  needed  to avoid  the  flow  of
financial  assets  from  countries  with  a tax  or a tax  with  a higher  rate  than
the  rest  of the  countries  to countries  without  the  tax  or  with lower  tax
rates. However,  it is  suggested  to  enforce  collection  on capital  gains  on
the  transfer  of luxury  houses  (to  be defined  in  an appropriate  way).  To
enable  successful  implementation  of the  tax,  it  is suggested  to update
cadastral  values  with frequent  intervals.  Again,  harmonization  of
policies,  but  not rates,  is suggested  among  the  member  countries.  Each_ 34 -
country  would  wish to design  its  own  rate  structure,  taking  into  account
variables  such  as level  and  distribution  of income  among  other  relevant
factors. It is  also  suggested  to separate  the  collection  of this  tax  from
the  ordinary  income  tax  to facilitate  collection.  This  might  conflict  with
the  objective  of ensuring  horizontal  equity,  but  administrative
difficulties  rule  out  taxing  incomes  earned  from  different  sources  in the
next  several  years. In the  future,  it is  suggested  to give  a serious
consideration  to  the  introduction  of  a capital  gains  tax  on financial
assets,  once  financial  and  capital  markets  reach  a higher  level  of
maturity.
134.  Taxation  of Interest  Earnings. All the  countries  in the  Region
face  challenges  in  deepening  financial  intermediation  and  in stimulating
financial  savings. A consideration  has  to be  given  also  to  encourage
financing  the  growth  of  companies  through  selling  equity  rater  than  debt.
It is,  therefore,  suggested  to eliminate  taxes  on interest  earnings  so as
to encourage  savings. Similarly,  maintenance  of exemptions  of interest
earnings  on securities  from  taxation  is  suggested. Exemptions  on interest
earnings  on savings  deposits  will  be needed  to  encourage
institutionalization  of savings. Harmonization  of these  matters  within  the
Region  is suggested.
2.6. Labor  taxation
135.  Unemployment  and  underemployment  rose  in all  the  countries  in the
Region  in the  recent  past,  partly  as a result  of declining  economic
activity  and  partly  as a result  of the  impact  of the  incentive  policies
which  overprice  labor  compared  to  capital. In view  of the  expected  high
growth  of the  labor  force  in  these  countries,  taxation  of labor  has to  be
low  enough  to encourage  the  use  of labor-intensive  technologies  by reducing
labor  costs. High  rates  of labor  taxation  clearly  contributed  to the
problem  in the  past,  reducing  competitiveness  of exports  by inflating  wage
costs  and  encouraging  capital-intensive  technologies.
136.  In each  country,  social  security  institutions  are  institutionally
set  up in  a different  way.  In  Costa  Rica,  there  is a  well-developed  health
and  pension  system. In addition  to the  Social  Security  Institute  (CCSS),
there  are  14 different  pension  schemes,  mostly  for  public  employees. In
Honduras,  there  are  five  different  agencies  administering  social  security.
The rates  of the  tax  and  contributions  by the  employers,  employees  and  the
Governmpnt  differ  under  each  scheme  in  Honduras. Some  of these  entities
carry  out  health-care  functions  in addition  to providing  pensions
(disability,  old  age,  and  death),  while  others  are in  charge  of
administrating  pensions.
137.  In  Costa  Rica,  social  security  taxes  have  gradually  increased  from
20%  to 32Z  of the  payroll  in  ten  years. Employer  contributions  have  risen
2.5  times  during  the  same  period. Employer  contributions  expsnded  from  9?
to 22%.  If  all  other  charges  are  included,  social  charges  amount  to 58?
of the  payroll  costs  in  Costa  Rica. The  ratio  is  high  compared  to  the
country's  level  of economic  activity. In fact,  Costa  Rica  has the  highest
payroll  tax in  the  developing  world.- 35 -
138.  The  countries  in the  Region  have  relied  on rate  increases  in  the
past to  cover  public  sector  deficits. In some  cases,  surpluses  have  been
invested  in low-yielding  government  securities,  hampering  long-run
viability  of pension  systems.
139.  Coverage  of the  systems  also  differs  in  each  country. In  Costa
Rica,  for  example  a large  share  of the  population,  mostly  urban,  is  covered
under  the  system. In Honduras,  on the  other  hand,  only  a small  share  of
the  population,  mostly  public  sector  employees,  is  covered  by pensions,
while  agricultural  employees  and  independent  workers  are  not insured. This
creates  distortions  in the  production  cests  across  sectors.
140.  Although  most  pension  plans  have  strong  finances  in  the  short-
term,  the  financial  prospects  of  most  of these  entities  are  bleak  in  the
long-term. For  pension  plans,  expected  increases  in retirement  benefits
could  lead  to financial  imbalances  in  the  ftture. One  reason  for  the
short-term  comfortable  financial  situation  of some  of these  entities  is
that  pension  plan  surpluses  are  transferred  to  health-care  program  to
finance  the  latter's  losses  at a zero  cost.  In  fact,  finances  of some
institutions  (i.e.  IHSS  in  Honduras)  is  shaky  even  in the  short-term  owing
to delays  in  payment  of the  Government's  commitments.  In  other  cases.
where  the  program  is  new  and is  not  merged  with  a costly  health-care
program  as in  INJUMPEMP  in  Honduras,  current  savings  could  be substantial
(2Z  of  GDP in  1987). Other  factors  which  lead  to  high-cost  operations
include  excessively  high  operating  costs  (i.e.  due  to  overemployment),
inadequate  fees  for  medical  services,  capital-intensive  technology  employed
in  medicare  as  well as large-scale  tax  evasion.
141.  The level  of  development  of the  social  security  systems  in the
Region  varies. Costa  Rica  has  a  well-developed  and  high  coverage  system,
whereas  in  other  countries,  the  development  is incipient.
.x2.  Conclusions.  An effort  has  to  be made  to  harmonize  taxation  of
labor  to facilitate  free  movement  of labor  across  countries.  Those
countries  with high  labor  taxes  may  not  attract  capital  owing  to implied
high  costs. Obviously,  the  skill  level  of the  workforce  is another
important  factor  in the  decision  of the  investors.  Nevertheless,  labor
taxation  should  not be  permitted  to become  an obstacle  to export  growth.
2.7.  Inflation-Adjustment
143.  With an increase  in domestic  inflation,  a  bracket  creep  on income
taxes  for  some  taxpayers  occurred  in  some  countries. Similarly,  the
increased  nominal  value  of  monetary  assets  resulted  in  high  effective  rates
for  corporations.
144.  It is  suggested  to introduce  automatic  indexation  allowances  to
income  and  to corporate  incomes  under  the  income  tax. Particularly,  it is
recommended  to apply  progressive  rates  to  constant  real  incomes  rather  than
to  constant  nominal  incomes.- 36 -
3.  Sectoral  Issues
145.  This section  discusses  issues  related  to  taxation  of agriculture
and  public  sector  enterprises.
3.1. Taxation  of the  Agriculture  Sector
146.  All the  countries  in  the  Region  produce  both  exportable
traditional  products  (i.e.  coffee,  bananas,  sugar,  cotton,  and  cocoa)  as
well  as basic  gzains  (i.e.  rice,  sorghum,  and  corn). Wheat  is imported,
mostly  from  the  U.S.  under  the  PL-480  program. In  general,  the  countries
in the  Region  have  a comparative  advantage  in the  production  of traditional
products. However,  basic  grains  production  is inefficient  and  it is  not
obvious  whether  the  Region  has  a comparative  advantage  in  the  production  of
basic  grains.
147.  Tax  collection  from  the  dgriculture  sector  is  low,  except  for
traditional  export  crops. First,  the  share  of the  sector  in the  economy  in
all  the  countries  has  declined  over  time. Second,  a very  low  share  of
agriculture  income  is subject  to income  taxation. Third,  subsistence
farmers  retain  a significant  share  of their  production  for  home  consumption
and  hence  avoid  paying  taxes.
148.  While  export  agriculture  is taxed,  basic  grains  are  subsidized.
Coffee  production  is  handled  mostly  by large  firms  in  Guatemala,  although
small  firms  dominate  production  in  Honduras  and  in  Costa  Rica. In El
Salvador,  the  authorities  tried  to break  up the  large  coffee  holdings
through  land  reform  after  1979. Banana  production  is  mostly  in  the  hands
of foreign  companies. The  countries  in the  Region  provide  subsidies  to
basic  grain  producers  to achieve  self-sufficiency.  Producers  are  mostly
small  except  for  those  producing  rice. Consumer prices  are  also
subsidized  to protect  the  urban  population.  The  public  sector  finances
subsidies  from  the  budget. Since  yields  are  low  compared  to  world
averages,  production  is  high-cost. Despite  the  subsidies,  domestic  prices-
-both  at the  producer  and  the  at consumer  level--are  higher  compared  to
international  prices. The  policies  are  implemented  by public  entities
responsible  for  marketing  basic  grains  in  the  Region. The  losses  of some
of these  entities  were large  in  the  past  and  contributed  to the  increased
overall  non-financial  public  sector  deficits. The  SAL  I  operation  in  Costa
Rica,  for  example,  aimed  at reducing  losses  of  CNP--Consejo  Nacional  de
Produccion,  the  basic  grains  marketing  agency--while  moving  domestic  prices
toward  international  price  equivaients.
149.  Agriculture  sectors  in  Central  America  are  discouraged  by import-
substitution  policies. These  policies  have  led  resources  to shift  from
agriculture  to industry. Export  agriculture  was further  penalized  by
taxes,  which  led  to negative  effective  protection.  Within  agriculture,
however,  basic  grains  agriculture  was  encouraged  not  only  through  price
subsidies  given  to  producers  as  well  as to consumers,  but  also  by
quantitative  import  restrictions  and  subsidies  on inputs,  low-cost  credit
and  exempticas  from  import  tariffs. It  is  rot  possible  to  quantify  at this
time  the  relative  profitability  of  basic  grains  vis-a-vis  import-
substitution  activities  in industry,  but  clearly  effective  protection
accorded  to  basic  grains  is  high. Assistance  provided  to  non-traditional- 37 -
export  agriculture,  however,  remains  limited. This latter  point  is
important  to  explain  why  non-traditional  exports  have  not  achieved
spectacular  growth  rates  as some  scholars  on  Central  America  expected  based
on the  granting  of some  limited  incentives.
Conclusions
150.  Efforts  should  be made  to develop  the  sector  and  accelerate
production,  exports  and  employment.  Taxation  policies  should  be  used  to
bring  about  needed  structural  changes. First  and  foremost,  quantitative
restrictions  on imports  would  need to  be phased  out.  To  achieve  these
objectives,  domestic  prices  of basic  grains  need  to be aligned  with
international  equivalents  and  subsidies  phased  out.  Furthermore,
assistance  to  non-traditional  export  agriculture  has  to  be stepped  up.
151.  The  net impact  of  the  suggested  changes  on government  finances
should  be favorable. Phasing  out  subsidies  to  basic  grains  should  lead  to
a reduction  in the  overall  deficit  of the  public  sectors  in  the  Region.
This  should  also  contribute  to a  more rational  allocation  of resources  in
these  countries. However,  increased  assistance  to  non-traditional  export
agriculture  will likely  require  additional  publir  outlays.
152.  From  the  point  of view  of taxation,  agricultural  income  could  be
classified  into  following  four  categories:
(i)  subsistence  sector;
(ii)  primary  exports;
(iii)  incomes  in  the  agriculture  sector;  and
(iv)  agricultural  property.
Taxation  of subsistence  agriculture  is  not  recommended  at  this  stage,  given
low  incomes  and  rural  poverty  as  well  as consequent  political  difficulties
likely  to  be faced  as a result  of  a tightened  collection  effort. Hence,
basic  grains  should  be exempted  from  domestic  taxes. Taxation  of  primary
exports  is  discussed  separately  in the  report. Taxation  of agriculture
income  through  income  taxes  is  difficult.  As discussed  elsewhere  in the
report,  it is suggested  that  selective  export  taxes  be used  as a substitute
for  income  taxes  in  the  short-to-medium  term (i.e.  tax  on coffee  and  banana
exports). In the  long-term,  however,  it  is suggested  that  income  taxes
replace  commodity  taxes. Taxes  on agricultural  property  and  land  would
need  to  be increased  and  forcefully  applied. In countries  such  as  El
Salvador,  where  land  is scarce  and  the  distribution  of land  and  incori.e  is
unequal,  land  taxes  could  serve  the  objective  of equity.  the  distribution
of income  as  well as to improve  utilization  of land. Fiscal  reform  in
agriculture  has  to  be accompanied  by the  liveraliza  ion  of agriculture
sector  policies,  in  particular,  pricing  and  trade  policies. Phasing  out
price  controls  and  quantitative  import  restrictions  should  contribute  to
revenue  growth  in  all  the  countries  in  the  Region.
3.2.  State  Economic  Enterprises
153.  In the  Region,  there  has  been  a  proliferation  of the  number  of
public  enterprises  in the  past  several  decades. In some  countries,  such  as- 38  -
in  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras,  both  the  number  and  financial  significance  of
these  enterprises  grew  steadily. In  the  case  of Guatemala,  the  public
enterprise  sector  remained  limited  as the  authorities  did  not  wish to  have
a large  public  sector  to  maintain  financial  equilibrium,  given  the
historically  low  tax  ratio  noted  elsewhere  in the  report. In El Salvador,
a  number  of  enterprises  were established  to  execute  and  monitor  the
Agrarian  Reform  after  1979.
154.  The  impact  of state  economic  enterprises  on  public  sector  finances
is significant  in  the  Region. In some  years  and  for  some  countries,  the
Jeficits  of state  economic  enterprises  accounted  for  the  bulk  of the  total
non-financial  public  sector  deficit. Pricing  and  investment  decisions  play
a key  role  in the  net  impact  of these  enterprises  on their  overall
finances. Not  adjusting  prices  in  line  with increasing  domestic  inflation
and  devaluations  as  well  as  undertaking  ambitious  public  investment
programs  without  ensuring  prudent  levels  of financing  also  add  to  the
financial  problems  of  these  countries.
155.  There  are  also  dissimilarities  regarding  the  adjustment  experience
in  the  Region. In  Costa  Rica,  for  example,  there  has  been  a  demonstrated
willingness  on the  part  of the  Government  to adjust  public  sector  prices  in
line  with financial  requirements.  In  Guatemala,  however,  the  scope  for
revising  prices  has  created  difficult  political  problems. In  Honduras,  the
fixed  exchange  rate  policy  of the  Government  has ruled  out  most  public
price  adjustments.
156.  The  overall  finances  of state  economic  enterprises  do  not show  a
uniform  pattern  in  the  Region. Some  enterprises  have  incurred  large
deficits  on their  current  accounts  as  well as  on their  overall  finances.
In  part,  these  deficits  stem  from  inefficiencies  in  operations  (i.e.
overemployment).  Almost  all  power  companies  in  the  Region  have  faced  or
are facing  difficult  financial  situations  (i.e.  ENEE  in  Honduras,  ICE  in
Costa  Rica,  and  INDE  in  Guatemala),  whereas  telecommunications  and  port
operations  are  generally  profitable  (i.e.  The  Port  Authority  in  Honduras).
In  general,  public  enterprises  run  large  arrears  on their  payment
obligations  to  other  public  utilities  (i.e.  to  water,  electricity,
telephone  companies),  leading  to  a deterioration  of finances  of the
creditor  entities  and  failure  to  pay  for  taxes  leads  to distortions  in
resource  allocation  in  the  economy. Whereas  in  Costa  Rica,  the  Central
Government  was the  recipient  of transfers  from  the  rest  of the  public
sector  on  a net  consolidated  basis,  in  Honduras  the  Central  Government
transferred  resources  to the  rest  of the  public  sector,  and  mostly  to  ENEE
to finance  its  investment  program  and  in  some  years  even  for  the  entity's
working  capital  requirements.
157.  Some  of the  enterprises  have  been  established  in those  areas  in
which  the  private  sector  has  a comparative  advantage. In addition,  some
enterprises  have  been  inadequately  managed,  resulting  in inefficiency  and
waste. Both  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras  began  to divest  some  of these
enterprises  (i.e.  The  Public  Development  Bank,  CODESA,  in  Costa  Rica  and
the  Public  Development  Bank,  CONADI,  in  Honduras). Honduras  is also  in  the
process  of  defining  the  coverage  of enterprises  it  intends  to  privatize  in
the  next few  years.- 39 -
Conclusions
158.  Public  enterprises  should  be subject  to the  same  tax  regime  as
private  firms. In  other  words,  public  enterprises  should  not  be given  a
competitive  edge  or a  privileged  treatment  under  public  policy  such  as
subsidized  credit  or  other  forms  of subsidies.  These  enterprises  should  be
required  to  determine  the  prices  of  their  outputs  at  marginal  costs  and  pay
the  opportunity  cost  of their  inputs. In other  words,  their  outputs  and
inputs  should  be  valued  at  marginal  economic  costs. Given  the  scarcity  of
capital  in these  countries,  these  enterprises  should  earn  a satisfactorv
rate  of return  on invested  capital,  and  recover  at least  operating  and
maintenance  costs,  including  debt  service,  as  well as  a reasonable  amount
of their  capital  expenditures.  Subsidies  given  to public  sector
enterprises  should  be made  explicit  and  budgeted. These  entities  should
also  charge  other  public  sector  entities  for  the  sale  of their  services  and
output  and  begin  to  eliminate  arrears  to  each  other  that  they  have
accumulated  over  the  years. Central  Governments  should  be required  to  pay
the  relevant  public  entities  for  the  use  of  electricity.  water  and
telephone  charges. To rationalize  operations  and  reduce  financial
disequilibria,  these  enterprises  should  also  reduce  their  redundant  and
inefficient  work force.
159.  The  privatization  efforts  underway  in  these  countries,  especially
in  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras,  should  be continued. The  authorities  may  wish
to consider  closing  down  enterprises,  whose  continued  operations  are  not
justified  under  the  present  circumstances.  One  option  to reduce  the  size
of the  public  sector  in  these  countries  is to  break  down  functions  of
public  enterprises  into  various  components  to  determine  which  ones  could  be
terminated,  reformulated  or passed  on to the  private  sectoc  through  sale,
management  contracts  or other  instruments.  One such  example  of a public
enterprise  is  IHCAFE  in  Honduras. The  entity  is  currently  in charge  of a
series  of functions  which  are  already  being  fullfilled  by other  public  and
private  sector  entities. If those  functions  are  transferred  to the
corresponding  entities,  IHCAFE  should  then  be closed  down.  Care  has  to be
taken  to  ensure  that  future  growth  of public  enterprises  does  not  crowd  out
the  private  sector.
160.  It is  essential  that  public  sector  institutions  which  generate
financial  profits,  such  as telecommunications  and  ports,  be taxed. As long
as prices  are  determined  based  on  marginal  costs,  and  the  investment
programs  of the  entities  in  those  sectors  respond  to the  structural
adjustment  needs  of the  countries,  overall  surpluses  of these  entities
would  need to  be transferred  to  Central  Governments  in taxes.
4.  Fiscal  Incentives
161.  Central  American  countries  have  provided  various  incentives  to
different  productive  activities  since  the  inception  of the  Customs  Unions.
Some  of those  incentives  were granted  to reinforce  the  regional  import-
subs',;tution  policies,  while  others  were provided  to increase  the
profitability  of exports  outside  the  CACM. The  provision  of the  latter
type  of incentives  failed,  in  the  past,  to  alter  the  anti-export  bias  of
the  CACH  trade  regime  in  any  significant  way.  In general,  the  fiscal
incentives  aim  at the  following:- 40  -
(i)  increasing  gross  revenues  from  exports;
(ii)  reducing  the  cost  of imported  inputs  for  domestic
industriest  and
(iii)  increasing  after-tax  profits  of  corporations  through
reducing  profit  tax  liabilities.
4.1. Tax  Exemptions
162.  In Central  America,  virtually  all  taxes  allow  a large  number  of
exemptions.  Especially  large  exemptions  under  the  imirt tax  are
significant.  In  Costa  Rica,  the  fiscal  cost  of  exemptions  under  the  import
tax  averaged  about  4Z - 52 of  GDP in  the  recent  past.  In El Salvador,  the
yield  from  the  import  tax  averaged  only  about  12 of  GDP.  Exemptions  are
generally  granted  to  diplomatic  representatives,  international
organizations,  cooperatives,  military,  religious  groups,  and  tourists.
Major  exemptions,  however,  are  given  to industry  (previously  under  the
industrial  incentive  scheme)  as  well as agriculture  and  public  sectors.
Cooperatives  are  exempted  from  income  taxes  in  most  countries  in  Central
America.
163.  The  granting  of exemptions  has  unfavorable  consequences.  First,
they  reduce  the  yield  and  collection  from  existing  taxes. Second,
exemptions  under  the  import  tax  intensify  already  high  effective  prctection
to the  industrial  sector. Third,  exemptions  given  under  the  income  tax
distort  the  form  of ownership,  favoring  cooperatives  and  discouraging  other
forms  of ownership  such  as corporations.  They  also  reduce  the  already  low
share  of  direct  taxes  in  total  taxes. Additionally,  exemptions  granted  to
the  public  sector  generally  lead  to the  inefficient  use  of imports  by the
public  sector  and  they  discriminate  against  private  firms  which  are
required  to  pay  taxes  on their  imports  competing  with  public  sector  firms.
164.  Conclusions.  Any  meaningful  tax  reform  should  aim  at phasing  out
exemptions--except  those  provided  for  imported  inputs  for  non-traditional
exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM.  Clearly,  the  action  program  should  be
carefully  planned  and  executed  over  a  number  of years  to  allow  firms  to
adjust  to  new  economic  realities.  Elimination  of  public  sector  exemptions
is  vital  to induce  the  public  sector  entities  to increase  their  efficiency
and  reduce  waste.
4.2. Taxation  of Inputs
165.  The  objective  in the  taxation  of inputs  is to  permit  non-
traditional  exporters  to  markets  outside  the  CACM  to  purchase  their  inputs
at competitive  world  market  prices. To achieve  this  objective,  a free
trade  status  for  exporters  should  be established.  Additionally,  export
sectors  should  be able  to  obtain  non-tradable  inputs  (i.e.  public  goods  and
services  such  as electricity)  at efficiency  prices. The  former  can  be
ensured  through  establishing  and  maintaining  an effective  draw-back  system
as discussed  in  this  report. The  latter  requires  an  efficiency  pricing
system  for  public  goods.- 41 -
4.3.  Investment  Incentives
166.  The  previous  CACM  trade  incentive  framework  provided  for
investment  incentives  for  industrial  enterprises  under  "industrial
contracts"  to promote  private  investment  through  income  and  import  tariff
exemptions  on capital  goods. The  objective  of providing  such  incentives
was to lower  production  costs  in order  to  promote  investment  and  exports  as
well as  employment. They  were  also  used  to  provide  generous  incentives  to
encourage  industry  to locate  in  relatively  backward  areas  and  thus  reduce
the  geographical  concentration  of industry  around  the  capital  cities.
Following  the  introduction  of the  new trade  regime  on January  1,  1986,  the
regional  investment  incentive  scheme  was abolished. In its  place,  each
country  introduced  new  investment  incentives  on  a national  basis,  mostly
retaining  the  features  of the  previous  investment  incentives.
167.  In the  case  of Costa  Rica,  the  new  scheme  provides  partial  income
tax  exemptions  for  new  investments,  with  priority  assigned  to the  regional
market. The  incentives  are  granted  on the  basis  of various  criteria,
including  domestic  content  of production,  net  generation  of foreign
exchange  by firm,  regional  location  of induistry,  and  form  of  oi.nership-
-with  preference  being  assigned  to cooperatives.  Investment  incentives
assign  priority  to production  of intermediate  products,  light  machinery,
equipment  and  tools,  as  well  as to agro-industrial  products.
168.  While  the  need  to  encourage  private  investment  is a  high  priority,
it  is  not  evident  to  what extent  the  investment  incentive  scheme  as
implemented  in the  Central  American  countries  is  an effective  vehicle  for
achieving  this  goal. First,  there  is  the  possibility  that  firms  could  be
promoted  in  non-competitive  areas  through  these  incentives.  Second,  these
incentives  intensify  the  capital-bias  of  the  trade  regime  and  discourage
the  use  of labor-intensive  technologies.  Third,  the  provision  of
investment  subsidies  for  products  consumed  in  the  Region  heightens  the
regional  bias  of the  trade  regime  and  reduces  incentives  for  non-
traditional  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM. Fourth,  tax  exemptions
for  capital  goods  reduce  effective  protection  for  those  items  and  distort
the  incentive  system  regarding  the  choice  of products.
169.  In the  case  of Costa  Rica,  the  new investment  incentives  have  an
anti-export  bias.  Since  exports  are  already  exempt  from  income  taxes,
industrial  incentives  are  useful  only  for  non-exporting  activities.  The
sectors  in  which  the  authorities  assign  priority  do not  seem  to  be those  in
which  Costa  Rica  has  an apparent  comparative  advantage. Furthermore,  the
new  incentives  are  inconsistent  with the  strategy  of promoting  exports  to
markets  outside  the  CACM. Lastly,  these  incentives  reduce  the  already  low
share  of direct  taxes  in total  revenues.
170.  Conclusions. This  report  suggests  phasing  out  investment
incentives  as implemented  in  Central  America. It is suggested  to  provide
exemptions  on  capital  goods  planned  to  be used  for  manufacturing  non-
traditional  exports  outside  the  CACM  for  a limited  period. Other
incentives  could  be designed  to  encourage  private  investment,  such  as
accelerated  depreciation  and  tax  holidays  for  less  developed  regions  of the
countries  in the  Region. In the  latter  case,  tax  incentives  should  not  be
used  as  a substitute  for  the  provision  of adequate  infrastructure.  Among- 42 -
the  countries,  it is  important  to  ensure  uniformity  of incentives,
including  those  that  relate  to  granting  of incentives  for  foreign  firms  on
repatriation  of  earnings,  land  titling  and  provisions  governing  employment
of labor. Harmonization  of incentives  is  needed  to avoid  ruinous
competition,  which  might  ensue  among  the  countries  in trying  to outbid  each
other  to attract  foreign  investors.  Hence,  harmonization  of incentives  on
this  issue  is essential.
4.4.  Export  Incentives
171.  To reduce  the  anti-export  bias  of the  trade  regime  and  encourage
the  growth  of exports,  virtually  all  the  countries  in the  Region  attempted
to  provide  export  incentives  to  non-traditional  exports  to  markets  outside
the  CACM.  These  incentives  generally  take  two  forms:  (i)  direct  subsidies
to  a defined  group  of non-traditional  exports  outside  the  CACM  on the  basis
of either  value  added  generated  in  exporting  or  on a FOB  export  value
basis;  and (ii)  permitting  firms  to  use imported  inputs  at  world  market
prices  through  various  draw  back schemes. The  first  type  of incentive  is
granted  as a  CAT  and  a CIEX  in  Costa  Rica,  and  the  second  type  is  granted
under  various  schemes  such  as draw  backs,  maquilas,  and  export  contract
regimes  (i.e.  which  offers  a  package  of incentives  to  exporters  through  a
defined  program  of export  growth). Rebates  on taxes  are  either  given  as a
share  of FOB  value  (as  in  CATs)  or as  export  increments  (as  in  CIEXs).
Regarding  the  latter  incentive,  tariff  exemptions  are  granted  both  to
imported  intermediate  and  capital  goods. The  fiscal  loss  associated  with
both  of those  schemes  have  been  high  in  the  past,  forcing  governments  to
abandon  granting  of CATs  or  decreasing  the  range  of  products  eligible  to
receive  these  incentives  in  cases  of fiscal  difficulties.
Conclusions
172.  Given  the  tight  fiscal  situation  in all  the  countries  in  Central
America  and  the  high  fiscal  cost  of these  incentives,  this  report  suggests
that  export  subsidies  be phased  out  and  exchange  r%tes  be relied  upon  as
the  main  vehicle  for  promoting  exports. In the  short-term,  it  may  be
useful  to retain  this  incentive,  given  the  difficulties  of adjusting  the
exchange  rate  adequately  in  virtually  all  the  countries  in the  Region.
173.  Given  the  strong  anti-export  bias  of the  trade  regimes  of these
countries,  however,  these  subsidies  offset  to some  extent  the  cost
disabilities  faced  by exporters,  and  hence  retaining  them  in the  short-term
should  not  be objectionable.  However,  GATT  rules  require  that  all
subsidies  be eliminated.  Costa  Rica,  for  example,  applied  to  GATT  for
membership  in 1987  and  GATT rules  require  the  elimination  of the  CAT
subsidy  in  order  for  Costa  Rica  to  be able  to  join  this  multilateral
institution.  In  view  of this  requirement,  rapid  dismantling  of tariff
barriers  coupled  with  more flexible  and  aggressive  management  of the
exchange  rate  will  be needed  to  achieve  export  competitiveness  in  the
absence  of this  export  incentive.
174.  Regarding  the  various  draw  back  schemes,  it  is suggested  that  this
feature  of the  incentive  system  be  maintained,  but  its  administration
should  be improved. This  scheme  allows  exporters  to obtain  inputs  at  world- 43 -
market  prices. This  is essential  to  meet quality  demands  of stringent
export  markets. This  report  also  suggests  that  these  inputs  be exempted
from  domestic  transaction  taxes  and  indirect  exporters  obtain  access  to
these  exemptions  (i.e.  both from  import  and  domestic  transaction  taxes  for
both  capital  and  intermediate  inputs). Obviously,  the  incorporation  of
indirect  exporters  to the  scheme  will likely  take  time,  but  an effort  has
to be initiated  in  that  direction.
175.  To have successful  draw  back  and  maquila  schemes  requires  the
elimination  of tax  exemptions  granted  to imports  under  various  schemes. If
a large  share  of imports  are  exempted  from  the  payment  of import  duties,
the  differential  impact  of this  scheme  on the  relative  profitability  of
non-traditional  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM  vis-a-vis  import-
substitution  activities  should  improve.
176.  There  is also  a  need for  separating  exemptions  granted  for  capital
goods  from  those  given  to raw  materials  and  intermediate  products. The
former  should  be handled  through  a longer-term  contract  such  as an export
contract  as  practiced  in  Costa  Rica,  while  administration  of  the  latter
should  be automatic. Development  of reliable  input-output  coefficlencies
is  a prerequisite  to  a  well-functioning  draw  back scheme. Without  those
coefficients,  it  may prove  to  be difficult  to  monitor  an effective
functioning  of the  system. Leakages  (i.e.  use  of exemptions  for  purposes
not related  to the  original  purpose  of the  scheme)  could  well  be high,  with
other  exports  (i.e.  those  to  CACM  and  traditional  exports)  also  benefiting
under  the  system  and  offsetting  the  benefits  assigned  to  non-traditional
exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACH.
4.5.  Income  tax  exemptions  for  non-traditional
exports  outside  the  CACM
177.  This  incentive  includes  exemptions  from  income  earned  on  non-
traditional  exports  outside  the  CACH. For  example,  Costa  Rica  introduced  a
100% income  tax  exemption  on profits  generated  by non-traditional  exports
to  markets  outside  the  CACM.  This  scheme  is  estimated  to  provide  a subsidy
of roughly  102  of the  FOB  export  value. Administrative  costs  and  delays
reduce  the  benefit  of this  exemption.
178.  Conclusions. Incentives  are  granted  to  non-traditional  exporters
through  various  incentive  schemes  (export  subsidies,  exemptions  from  import
taxes  on inputs  and  capital  goods). A flexible  management  of the  exchange
rate  should  provide  adequate  financial  profitability  to this  category  of
exports. Hence,  further  incentives  in  the  form  of exemptions  from  import
taxes  is  not suggested. It is  important  that  this  aspect  of the  tax  system
be  harmonized.
5.  Institutional  Issues
179.  This  section  deals  with issues  relared  to institutional  rigidities
in the  tax  systems  of the  Central  American  countries. One such  major
institutional  rigidity  is  the  practice  of earmarking  as  explained  below.- 44 -
The  Practice  of Tax  Earmarking
180.  Most countries  in the  Region  have  an established  practice  of
earmarking  revenues  to  be spent  for  pre-determined  activities  or
institutions  in  pre-determined  ways.  Costa  Rica  has  the  most  extensive
earmarking  system,  where  about  100  individual  taxes  are  --  partly  or
wholly--earmarked.  Major  taxes,  including  income,  payroll,  salos,  and
export  taxes,  are  all  earmarked. Some  earmarked  taxes  accrue  solely  to the
Central  Government,  some  are  shared  by the  Central  Government  and  other
entities  and  some  are  collected  by entities  outside  the  Central  Government.
Many  of the  taxes  have  multiple  beneficiaries.  In the  rest  of the  Region,
a  certain  percentage  of current  revenues  are  earmarked  for  universities  as
well as the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  (i.e.  6Z of current  revenues  in  Costa
Rica).
181.  The  practice  of earmarking  has led  to various  distortions  and
problems. It  reduced  governments'  discretionary  spending  powers,  aid  their
ability  to set  expenditure  priorities  and  fund  new  and  better  programs. It
also  decreased  fiscal  discipline  and  encouraged  expenditure  growth  through
perpetuating  programs,  some  of  which  may  have  outlived  their  usefulness.
Since  revenue  increases  are  immediately  converted  into  expenditures,  they
also  contribute  to the  fiscal  deficit.
182.  Conclusions.  Over  the  years,  vested  interests  have  developed  to
maintain  and  even  expand  this  practice. Especially  in  Costa  Rica,
virtually  all  new taxes  introduced  since  1980  were,  partly  or  wholly,
earmarked. Thus,  any  change  in  the  direction  of eliminating  or even
reducing  earmarking  will prove  to  be politically  very  difficult  in the
short-term.  Within  the  context  of its  medium-term  program,  Costa  Rica
agreed  not  to introduce  any  new  earmarking.  However,  it is  important  for
all  the  countries  to  move in the  direction  of phasing  out  the  practice  of
earmarking,  with the  pace  dictated  by the  political  realities  in  each
country.
6.  Tax  Administration
183.  Tax  administration  is  weak in  all the  countries  in  Central
America. As a result,  it  is  believed  that  large  evasion  exists  in  almost
all  taxes. Obviously,  it does  not  make sense  to continually  revise  tax
rates  without  a corresponding  effort  being  made  to improve  collection
through  reforming  the  tax  administration.
184.  Large  evasion  in  most taxes  results  from  a  number  of factors.
First,  penalty  payments  are  not  called  for  in  case  of delinquencies.
Second,  both  the  number  and  training  of tax  inspectors  are  inadequate.  The
renumeration  of tax  administrators  is  widely  believed  not  to be adequate  to
induce  them  to  work  honestly. Third,  the  enforcement  effort  spread  over  a
number  of taxpayers  and  enterprises  dilutes  the  tax  effort. Fourth,  a
unified  tax  registry  does  not  exist. Fifth,  collectinn  lags  are  high,
leading  to reduced  revenues  in real  terms,  especially  in  high  inflation
countries. Collection  lags  are  usual  for  about  six  months  for  some  taxes
in  El Salvador. Sixth,  various  taxes  are  collected  by different  entities.
Lack  of coordination  among  these  entities  (i.e.  customs  administration  for
taxes  on trade  and  internal  revenue  service  for  domestic  transaction  taxes- 45  -
and  for  personal  income  and  corporate  taxes)  makes  it  difficult  to cross-
check  information,  especially  between  income  and  sales  taxes  as well  as
between  customs  revenues  and  domestic  transaction  taxes. Seventh,
existence  of a large  number  of taxes  with limited  yields  and  complicated
tax structures  make it  difficult  to administer  taxes  and  increase  tax
compliance  costs  for  taxpayers.
185.  One result  of the  weak  administration  of taxes  has  been  the  low
number  of contributors  for  taxes. Table  IV shows  the  number  of individual
contributors  and  tax  paying  legal  entities  under  major  taxes  in  El Salvador
as an example.
Table  IV:  Number  of  Contributors  Under  Major
Taxes  in  El Salvador,  1987
Taxes  Number  of Contributors
Income  Tax  51,657
Individuals  (49,376)
Legal  Entities  (  2,281)
Property  Income  14,480
Individuals  (11,931)
Legal  Entities  (  2,549)
Sales  8,086
Individuals  (  6,549)
Legal  Entities  (  1,537)
Source: IMF,  Bank  Staff  Estimates.
186.  Conclusions. To reduce  evasion  and  increase  collection  from
existing  and  proposed  taxes,  the  following  actions  are  suggested:
(i)  establishing  reasonable  penalty  rates  for  tax
delinquencies  and  forcefully  implementing  them (i.e.  high
penalty  rates  would  likely  prove  to  be politically
difficult  to apply);
(ii)  providing  training  and  technical  assistance  to tax
administration  agencies,  adjusting  salaries  of tax
administrators  in line  with  changes  in the  cost  of living
in order  to reduce  incentives  for  seeking  other  sources  of
income  and  firing  staff  in  cases  of  demonstrated  lack  of
integrity;
(iii)  concentrating  tax  collection  efforts  on large  corporations
and  on  wealthy  people;
(iv)  establishing  a unified  tax  registry;- 46 -
(v)  implementing  a  program  to reduce  collection  lags;
(vi)  eliminating  small  taxes  with limited  yields;
(vii)  establishing  and  maintaining  close  coordination  among  the
various  units  in charge  of tax  administration  to
facilitate  cross-checking  information;  and
(viii) simplifying  tax  administration  and  complicated  tax
structures  to  reduce  collection  and  taxpayer  compliance
costs.
D.  Impact  of  Liberalization  Policies  on Fiscal  Revenues
187.  The  countries  in  the  Region  have  started  or are  in the  process  of
considering  undertaking  liberalization  measures  in financial  sectors  and  in
agriculture.  On balance,  the  impact  of liberalization  policies  on fiscal
revenues  should  be positive. First,  if  further  tariff  reform  is
accompanied  by an increase  in  the  tariff  floor  rate  and  a reduction  in
exemptions,  fiscal  revenues  should  expand. Moreover,  growth  in financial
aggregates--as  a result  of financial  liberalization--should  lead  to  higher
tax  collection  in  response  to an expansion  in  economic  activity.
Similarly,  liberalization  of agricultural  policies  should  increase  revenues
as efficient  production  is  encouraged.  Additionally,  reduced  subsidies  on
basic  grains  (in  which  comparative  advantage  does  not  seem  to exist  in  the
Region)  and  increased  tariff  revenues  from  liberalized  trade  (i.e.  through
phasing  out  quantitative  import  restrictions)  should  provide  additional
fiscal  revenues.
E.  Medium-Term  Economic  Goals
188.  The  medium-term  objective  of all  the  countries  in  Central  America
should  be to regain  an acceptable  growth  rate  cor-sistent  with  a sustainable
balance  of  payments  position. Taxation  policies  should  be consistent  with
this  medium-term  objective. In particular,  they  should  contribute  to
improving  resource  allocation  through  modifications  in taxes  on trade  and
in  domestic  transaction  taxes. Reduction  in  effective  protection  w'ill  make
exporting  profitable  compared  to selling  in the  regional  and  domestic
markets. Elimination  of  taxes  on  exports  except  those  on coffee  and
bananas  will  improve  their  profitability.  On the  other  hand,  increased
taxation  of domestic  transactions  would  tend  to increase  exportable  supply
by constraining  domestic  consumption  and  improve  balance  of payments
through  reducing  import  demand.
F.  Phasing  of Reforms
189.  The  medium-term  objective  of the  tax  reform  should  be to shift
reliance  from  taxes  on trade  to those  on domestic  transactions  and  income.
This  goal  can  not  be  achieved  in the  short-term,  given  the  current  weak  tax
administration  capacity  in  the  Region. It  also  has to  be noted  that  the- 47 -
countries  may not  be able  to  undertake  complicated  reforms.  d  speed  with
which  rationalization  measures  can  be implemented  will,  be consf  ained  by
revenue  needs  as  well  as administrative  capacity  in  each  country.
190.  Three  points  deserve  mentioning  regarding  the  rationalization  of
tax  structures.  First,  it  is  not  realistic  to expect  a simultaneous
introduction  of all  changes  in  one  stage. Hence,  there  will be  a need  for
sequencing  of reforms  to  ensure  that  the  rationalization  process  does  not
lead  to  net  losses  of government  revenues. Second,  incremental  changes
need  to  be consistent  withi  the  long-term  desired  tax  structure,  and
temporary  changes  should  not  be introduced  just  to  generate  revenues.
Third,  the  number  of tax  changes  should  be  minimized.
191.  Given  the  openness  of the  economies  in  Central  America  and  the
inability  to control  smuggling  through  the  borders  as  well  as the  ease  with
which  traders  can  underinvoice  export  receipts  and  overinvoice  import
expenditures,  tax  rates  on trade  (both  on exports  and  imports)  should  be
set  at reasonable  levels.
G.  Main  Conclusions
192.  General  principles  needed  for  the  harmonization  of tax  policies  in
the  Region  include  the  following:
(i)  continuing  the  trade  liberalization  process,  already
started,  through  reducing  the  level  and  dispersion  in
effective  protection;
(ii)  shifting  reliance  of the  tax  system  from  trade  to domestic
transactions  and  income;
(iii)  making  the  value  added  tax  cum selective  consumption  taxes
the  backbone  of the  tax  system  and  harmonizing  those  taxes
among  the  member  countries;
(iv)  harmonizing  taxes  on inputs  and  exempting  non-traditional
exporters  from  the  payment  of import  duties  on imports;
(v)  moving  in  the  direction  of coordinating  taxes  on factor
incomes  (i.e.  personal  income,  corporate  income,  poverty
and  land  taxes,  taxes  on financial  gains)  to avoid  double
taxation  and  provision  of competitive  tax  incentives  among
member  countries,  or using  factor  income  taxation  to
discriminate  against  nationals  of  other  countries;
(vi)  eliminating  export  taxes  on  non-traditional  exports
outside  the  CACM;
(vii)  eliminating  all  quantitative  import  restrictions,  prior
imports  deposits,  non-common  import  tariffs  and  other
restrictions  on imports  from  other  CACM  members;
(viii) applying  similar  principles  in  designing  export  taxes  on
coffee  and  bananas;48 -
(ix)  not  using  differential  exchange  rates  to  discriminate
against  regional  trade;  and
(x)  improving  tax  administration.
193.  The  present  challenge  is to  transform  the  Central  American  Customs
Union  to a  modern  common  market. This  could  only  be achieved  through
strong  reform  of the  tariff  regime. This  report  makes  suggestions  for  an
action  plan  to  achieve  this  objective. It  does  not  analyze  the  political
feasibility  of the  suggested  actions,  and  assumes  that  they  are  doable. It
is important  to  note,  however,  that  at this  juncture,  options  to grow  out
of the  present  economic  problems  are  limited  in the  Region  and  hence  the
implications  of not  undertaking  the  suggested  reforms  would  likely  be
politically  greater  than  introducing  those  reforms  over  time. If
implemented,  -- along  with other  structural  re-forms--it  is  hoped  that  these
reforms  would  help  spark  the  latent  growth  potontial  in  Central  American
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